American University Washington College of Law
From the SelectedWorks of Kenneth Anderson

January, 2005

Squaring the Circle? Reconciling Sovereignty and
Global Governance Through Global Government
Networks (Review of Anne-Marie Slaughter, a
New World Order)
Kenneth Anderson

Available at: https://works.bepress.com/kenneth_anderson/38/

ANDERSON - BOOKPROOFS

01/16/05 – 6:06 PM

BOOK REVIEW
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A NEW WORLD ORDER. By Anne-Marie Slaughter. Princeton and
Oxford: Princeton University Press. 2004. Pp. xviii, 341. $29.95 (cloth).

Reviewed by Kenneth Anderson∗
I. INTRODUCTION: THE GLOBALIZATION PARADOX
The eminent political scientist Robert O. Keohane propounded several years ago what he calls the “governance dilemma.”1 He states
that “[a]lthough institutions are essential for human life, they are also
dangerous.”2 Collectively we stand to benefit from a world governed
by rules and institutions; even determined market libertarians will
concede a certain level of public rules. Yet we also collectively resist
the creation of the institutions that might provide increased governance because of the threats those institutions pose to our liberty.
A New World Order is Anne-Marie Slaughter’s ingenious offering
to solve this collective global dilemma. Slaughter proposes a way to
avoid being impaled on either of the dilemma’s horns, securing the
benefits of cooperation without creating a wholly unregulated world
order or an oppressively coercive global authority.
Slaughter frames the dilemma as a “globalization paradox”: needing
more government yet fearing it (p. 8). On the one hand, she says,
“[p]eoples and their governments around the world need global institutions to solve collective problems that can only be addressed on a
global scale” (p. 8). Problems such as “global markets, global travel,
and global information networks . . . [, as well as] weapons of mass destruction and looming environmental disasters of global magnitude” (p.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
∗ Professor of Law, Washington College of Law, American University, and Research Fellow,
The Hoover Institution, Stanford University. E-mail: kanders@wcl.american.edu. Website:
http://kennethandersonlawofwar.blogspot.com. Thanks to Tod Lindberg, and also to Sanford
Levinson and Amy Chua, for their insights and for the opportunity to present parts of this Review
in seminars at the University of Texas Law School, the University of Siena, and Yale Law School.
Special thanks to those who made available to me congenial facilities to write in Seville, Spain;
Bishop, California; and the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.
1 Robert O. Keohane, Governance in a Partially Globalized World, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 1,
1 (2001).
2 Id.
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4) cannot be solved by any geographically limited legal jurisdiction;
they must be solved by an institution that is able to regulate the full
social and geographical extent of the activity. If the issue is the spread
of weapons of mass destruction, regulation applicable only in NATO
countries clearly will not deal with the problems arising from missiles
in North Korea or Iran. If the issue is the depletion of fishing stocks
in the common global seas, unilateral or even regional regulation cannot solve the tragedy of the commons. As Slaughter indicates, one
could produce almost endless examples from the global economy, the
environment, global organized crime, terrorism, and so on. These
problems suggest a need for global governance.
On the other hand, Slaughter notes that all of us have reasons to
fear the centralization of power that a truly global government implies,
if such a government were modeled on the existing ideal of the sovereign state. Slaughter rejects from the outset the ideal of a world government that would have the Hobbesian attributes of sovereignty that
nation-states now claim — the monopoly on legitimate violence within
a territory and the ability to enforce the law as a genuine command
backed by a threat. She flatly rejects the dream of world government,
now or in the future, on both idealist and practical grounds:
Yet world government is both infeasible and undesirable. The size and
scope of such a government presents an unavoidable and dangerous threat
to individual liberty. Further, the diversity of the peoples to be governed
makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos. No form of
democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles. (p. 8)

Slaughter’s language here is unambiguous. The second horn of the dilemma is not merely a practical one. It is also a theoretical one: a oneworld government is undesirable because of the threat it poses to liberty. This clarification is greatly welcome and tremendously helpful to
understanding Slaughter’s model.3 Slaughter’s ultimate aim then is to
resolve the globalization paradox without relaxing one of the horns,
thus ultimately eliminating the dilemma of governance.

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3 Specifically, I had never been wholly clear about the relationship of the model of liberal internationalism that Slaughter developed throughout the 1990s to state sovereignty or world federalism. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Burley, Law Among Liberal States: Liberal Internationalism and the
Act of State Doctrine, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1907, 1922–23 (1992); Anne-Marie Slaughter, International Law in a World of Liberal States, 6 EUR. J. INT’L L. 503, 516–34 (1995); Anne-Marie
Slaughter, A Liberal Theory of International Law, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 240 (2000); see
also Jose E. Alvarez, Interliberal Law: Comment, 94 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 249 (2000). This
Review discusses aspects of this relationship in more detail in Part II.
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The solution Slaughter offers is a theory of “government networks.”4 The term “networks” refers to relatively loose, cooperative
arrangements across borders between and among like agencies that
seek to respond to global issues (p. 14).5 Many of the most serious
threats perceived by nation-states, such as transnational terrorism, are
themselves caused by global networks — Al Qaeda and its many loose
affiliates being perhaps the most infamous example — and so, Slaughter says, “[n]etworked threats require a networked response” (p. 2).
Likewise, Slaughter sees networks forming throughout the globalized
world and believes that, as a descriptive and predictive matter, these
networks will form the core of a new world order of governance.
Yet it is not networks as such that form the core of Slaughter’s vision in A New World Order; vital to her account is the role played by
government networks. By “government networks” she means networks
of regulatory agents and agencies that reach out to their homologues
and other regulators across national borders and state jurisdictions.
The function of such outreach, which includes the sharing of information and, ultimately, the responsibility for action within a given regulatory sphere, is to close the gap between sovereign state jurisdictions
that might otherwise allow global threats to go unaddressed. For example, Slaughter points out that since September 11, 2001, public attention has focused on military action, but “the networks of financial
regulators working to identify and freeze terrorist assets, of law enforcement officials sharing vital information on terrorist suspects, and
of intelligence operatives working to preempt the next attack have
been equally important” (p. 2). As another example, she notes that under NAFTA, “U.S., Mexican, and Canadian environmental agencies
have created an environmental enforcement network, which has enhanced the effectiveness of environmental regulation in all three states,
particularly in Mexico” (pp. 2–3).
A New World Order supplies many such examples from many
fields. What these examples have in common is that they feature a
transnational actor or issue that either exists beyond a single state’s
borders while having effects within it, or else dwells in the spaces and
commons between states’ borders while having effects on states. Coordinated, networked action by government officials from different
states permits the gaps between sovereign states to be closed, while at
the same time (and this is a cornerstone of the theory) creating a new
sort of power, authority, and legitimacy.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
4 Slaughter gave this concept an earlier airing. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Government Networks: The Heart of the Liberal Democratic Order, in DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE AND
INTERNATIONAL LAW 199 (Gregory H. Fox & Brad R. Roth eds., 2000).
5 The term is deliberately drawn from information theory and computer science; the nonhierarchical sharing of information is a vital part of Slaughter’s theory.
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We might say, therefore, that Slaughter here presents a theory of
global interstices, a theory of the gaps. But this is a two-way theory.
Indeed, Slaughter offers both a theory of the power that can exist in
exploiting the interstices between sovereign states and a theory of the
power generated through new structures of authority to close those
gaps. Global networks can create genuinely new forms of authority
that are at once liberated in some special sense from their original jurisdictional framework and yet remain undeniably governmental, in
the sense that they are wholly creatures of governments that have preexisting grounds of legitimacy. The double function of power in the
interstices, and the combined functions of governments and networks,
are fundamental elements in Slaughter’s forceful theory.
A New World Order characterizes its theory of government networks as one based upon “descriptive and predictive empirical claims”
(p. 18). A certain amount of moralizing is necessarily part of Slaughter’s discussion of a just world order, but overall A New World Order
is a work of descriptive social order, not of moral imagination. Yet it
is a groundbreaking book, a striking combination of both pragmatism
and vision. Despite my several disagreements with the work, it is
thoughtful, profound, and deserving of wise reading and discussion.
Slaughter represents the cutting intellectual edge of this decade’s new
way of thinking about global governance.
This Review proceeds in six parts. Following this Introduction,
Part II lays out the range of available positions in the perennial debate
— standoff, really — between sovereignty and global governance.
This debate provides the framework for the solution offered by A New
World Order. Part III focuses on Slaughter’s internal argument, reconstructing and critiquing its central tenets, in particular the concepts of
“horizontal” and “vertical” government networks. Part IV examines
the fundamental premise of Slaughter’s internal argument, the claim of
“disaggregated states,” which leads to the corollary of “disaggregated
sovereignty.” Part V moves away from internal critique to offer an explicitly external critique of A New World Order based on the ideal of
“democratic sovereignty.” The external critique reaches a skeptical
conclusion as to whether A New World Order indeed offers a stable solution for avoiding the horns of Slaughter’s starting dilemma. The
analysis suggests that, eventually, government networks will seek to
assume supranational governance powers that are inconsistent with
democratic sovereignty and accountability, notwithstanding A New
World Order’s strenuous efforts to preserve balance among our desired
values. Finally, Part VI provides a brief conclusion to this Review.
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II. THE PERENNIAL ARGUMENT BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE
A. Forms of Idealism in the Debate
over Sovereignty and Global Governance
Any serious discussion of global governance typically frames itself
in the context of the perennial debate between realism and idealism in
international relations, politics, and law.6 Without addressing directly
the question of realism versus idealism in global governance, a discussion risks being categorized as irrelevant utopianism.
A New World Order must face up to realist scrutiny from those asking whether it supports or hinders sovereignty and sovereign interests,
which governments and states stand to benefit the most, and many
similar questions. It therefore begins with a discussion that is emphatically realist and empirical. Indeed, much of the book’s introduction specifically addresses the United States and discusses why, in cold
political realism, it would serve America’s traditional sovereign interests to embrace government networks. As a foreign policy option,
Slaughter says, “a world of government networks . . . should be particularly attractive to the United States” (p. 4). After all, the United
States has taken an active role in identifying the domestic roots of
many international problems, and it is also “coming to understand the
vital need to address those problems multilaterally rather than unilaterally, for reasons of legitimacy, burden sharing, and effectiveness”
(p. 4).
Yet addressing realist concerns about sovereignty is not at the heart
of Slaughter’s endeavor in A New World Order. Her primary goal,
rather, is to resolve the tangentially related standoff between sovereignty and global governance, between the preservation of liberty and
the benefits of institutional governance. The realist point is always
there — a political community or state risks losing its liberty and the
liberty of its members if it does not look to its sovereign interests and
to the maintenance of political power. But, as Slaughter recognizes,
gaining the benefits of cooperation among states remains an issue even
if a state has sufficient sovereign power to secure its liberties and those
of its subjects. The governance dilemma is not resolved simply by
having sovereign power, even a lot of it. The dilemma, in other words,
is not captured by the perennial debate about power between realists
and idealists. It is captured, rather, by a debate among different kinds
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
6 For this debate set in a standard international relations text, see JAMES E. DOUGHERTY &
ROBERT L. PFALTZGRAFF, JR., CONTENDING THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS:
A COMPREHENSIVE SURVEY 58–99 (4th ed. 1997).
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of idealists about whether sovereignty is desirable or fundamental.7
Although A New World Order makes many arguments based on an
appeal to the realist interests of states (and those of the United States
in particular), much more fundamental to its thesis is a debate over the
ideal nature of sovereignty and the ideal form of global governance.
This debate is, in essence, one among differing idealisms. It asks,
in effect, whether sovereignty embodies anything other than interests,
and whether one conception or another of sovereignty supports specific
moral and political values — in particular, those of liberty and democracy. The debate asks the same of global governance: how it might be
conceived and what moral and political values it embodies and supports. The debate assumes that conceptions of sovereignty and global
governance become contradictory and mutually exclusive; at least as
pertaining to first principles, it seems that they do. The ambition of A
New World Order is to reconcile what seem to be otherwise irreconcilable values and, hence, irreconcilable paradigms of sovereignty and
global governance.
Before examining how A New World Order attempts to fulfill its
ambitions, it may be helpful to map the various conceptions of sovereignty and global governance that, to this point, have seemed irreconcilable. The leading contemporary positions on sovereignty (as traditionally understood to mean the power to be left alone and to ignore
any outside interference) and global governance (as ordinarily understood to mean some kind of legal structure of rules binding on sovereigns or to mean the weakening or even disappearance of sovereignty
altogether) can be grouped into seven distinct categories.8
1. Sovereignty As Its Own Value, Sovereignty for Its Own Sake. —
Starting at the extreme end of the sovereignty spectrum is the simple
position that sovereignty is a value all its own. Under this theory, the
ability of a state, as a political community, to be subject to no outside
power, to be able to act without interference, is valuable for its own
sake. Sometimes expressed as the right of self-determination, the interest at the core of this position is sovereignty itself — the liberty of a
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
7 Jeremy Rabkin has recently offered a new, robust defense of democratic sovereignty. See
JEREMY A. RABKIN, THE CASE FOR SOVEREIGNTY: WHY THE WORLD SHOULD
WELCOME AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE (2004). This Review returns to this question about the
fundamental nature of sovereignty in Part V.
8 Although the most important two categories, democratic sovereignty and liberal internationalism, are terms widely in use — albeit with varying meanings — several of the others (multilateral pooled sovereignty, for example) are parsings of the existing positions, offered as analytic
possibilities in order to show the precise progression from one end of the spectrum of sovereignty
to the other. These parsed positions, in practice, get wrapped into one or the other of the widely
recognized positions. I do not mean to imply that there are actual adherents to each enumerated
position. In practice, participants in the debate tend to identify themselves as fundamentally
sympathetic to democratic sovereignty or to liberal internationalism.
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political community.9 Moreover, sovereignty is valuable even if the
state asserting this sovereignty has little if anything to recommend it
— the state need not be democratic, it need not respect human rights,
and so on. Because sovereignty is valuable per se, value attaches to
the sovereignty even of undemocratic states such as Saudi Arabia or
Saddam’s Iraq. Respect for the sovereignty even of wicked states can
be defended on realist grounds, but the position herein described
grounds itself in the intrinsic value of sovereignty, and so is a form of
idealism.
2. Democratic Sovereignty. — Like the “pure” sovereignty position,
democratic sovereignty champions the value of sovereignty. But it
does so not for the sake of sovereignty as such — although it often recognizes sovereignty as an independently legitimate value — but instead because sovereignty, and the pursuit of sovereign power and interests in the realist fashion, is a means of expressing another value:
democracy. Sovereignty is justified as a means of expressing and respecting the democratic will of a particular political community.10
With democratic sovereignty, therefore, the state itself essentially becomes the democratic expression of the political community. Democracy matters inside that political community in order for sovereignty to
be more than a very limited moral or political value. But the crucial
corollary — difficult to absorb into a conception of global governance
— is the fidelity of the state to its own internal democratic processes
rather than to any exterior structure of rules, laws, or commands from
larger global institutions. Democratic sovereignty is emphatically not
realism — the pursuit of sovereign power and interests for their own
sake. It is, rather, a form of idealism — one that gives precedence to
moral fidelity to the political community from which states and rulers
derive their legitimacy, their authority, and indeed their very claim to
sovereignty.11
This ideal of democratic sovereignty can be further refined to mean
constitutional democracy, a concept that those who embrace democratic sovereignty also accept. Constitutional democracy embraces constitutional limitations on the power of democratic majorities, the rule
of law expressed through independent courts, and a core of human and
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 Perhaps the most sympathetic defense of sovereignty as its own value is offered from the
perspective of self-determination. See MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS: A
MORAL ARGUMENT WITH HISTORICAL ILLUSTRATIONS 86–108 (1977). Offering an argument grounded purely on communal self-determination, Walzer believes that sovereignty can be
seen as a value even in manifestly unjust and undemocratic states.
10 See RABKIN, supra note 7, at 26–35; see also Kenneth Anderson, The Role of the United
States Military Lawyer in Projecting a Vision of the Laws of War, 4 CHI. J. INT’L L. 445, 456–57
(2003).
11 For a splendid recapitulation of this view by an unabashedly liberal American constitutional
scholar, see Jed Rubenfeld, The Two World Orders, WILSON Q., Autumn 2003, at 22.
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constitutional rights beyond amendment by mere democratic majorities. Democratic constitutional sovereignty privileges the political
community from which a democratic constitution arises, sees the
state’s legitimacy and sovereignty as arising from that community, and
sees the state’s fidelity as belonging to that community, even when this
fidelity conflicts with the demands of the larger institutional structures
of global reach and pretension. Global institutions neither carry nor
confer legitimacy upon constitutional, democratic sovereigns.
3. Sovereign State Multilateralism. — That democratic (or even
undemocratic) sovereigns do not derive their legitimacy and authority
from international institutions or global structures does not deprive
them of the ability to work with these institutions and structures. Accordingly, the ideal of sovereign state multilateralism recognizes that
sovereign states can cooperate together on any number of matters, in
structures ranging from ad hoc to formal, without compromising the
commitment of democratic sovereignty, provided that the state retains
its sovereignty by being able to opt out. The state may exercise its
prerogative to opt out even when doing so constitutes a violation of its
treaty agreements and incurs responses by other sovereigns. The optout arrangement represents an ideal of multilateralism that is compatible with democratic sovereignty, because ultimately the extent,
type, and duration of multilateral cooperation is determined by democratic sovereigns accountable to their political communities and acting
with their communities’ consent. The sovereign state multilateralism
model has been instantiated in ad hoc forms, such as the Bush Administration’s call for a “coalition of the willing” rather than for forces
authorized and sent forth by the Security Council, and in institutionalized forms, such as NATO. The importance of this ideal in relation to
the government networks proposed by A New World Order is plain.
4. Multilateral Pooled Sovereignty, Looking Toward Federalism. —
Another ideal of multilateralism is what might be called “multilateral
pooled sovereignty.” Here, the key normative feature is that sovereign
states act together in ways that are deliberately aimed at “pooling”
their sovereignty, through agencies, institutions, organizations, and
networks, both formal and informal. The institution, agency, or regulator that acts is the multilateral creation of sovereigns, but the result
is one in which the individual sovereign identities are commingled and
pooled so that it is not an actor consisting of identifiably sovereign
parts. The U.N. Secretariat, U.N. agencies such as the World Health
Organization, and other international organizations, such as the World
Bank or the International Monetary Fund, can all be conceived of as
realizations of this ideal. Indeed, it is this ideal to which the Secretary
General appeals — not, in my view, with complete sincerity — when
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he says that the U.N. is the creature of member states and not itself an
independent actor.12 Yet there is a deep ambiguity here, because many
of those committed to the ideal of pooled sovereignty, especially as instantiated in formalized institutions such as U.N. agencies, are also
committed, at least in their own world views, to transcending sovereign state multilateralism as the basis of institutional legitimacy and
adopting a genuinely global federal structure in which legitimacy resides not in sovereign states but in global government.
Hence the additional description, “looking toward federalism.”
This descriptive label recognizes that the ideal of pooled sovereignty is
conceived of by many of its participants — albeit often covertly — as
a progressive, transformative ideal whose optimal end is not the continued reign of democratic sovereigns, but is instead a pooling of sovereignty that leads to a new world federal political institution no
longer dependent for its legitimacy on the assent of democratic sovereigns. Clearly, this transformative ideal draws on the ideals of theorists of the transformation of the European Union’s “ever closer union”; clearly, too, it is an ideal of marked importance for the
government networks proposed by A New World Order.13
5. Global Governance Through (Public-Private) Global Policy Networks. — A rising concern about the lack of democratic accountability
in theories of supranational government led, as Slaughter notes, to the
championing in the 1990s of a new concept, “global governance,” as an
alternative to global government.14 Global governance was conceived
as “a much looser and less threatening concept of collective organization and regulation without coercion. A major element of global governance, in turn, has been the rise of global policy networks, celebrated

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12 As Slaughter puts it, “Kofi Annan repeatedly reminds his audiences that as Secretary General he is a spokesman for the United Nations and exercises limited powers on behalf of the Secretariat, but in the end his power depends almost entirely on the will of the member-states” (p. 159).
I would suggest, however, that the Secretary General is being disingenuous and falsely modest in
suggesting that his role is fundamentally ministerial. The Secretary General is obviously a
“player,” and never so much as when he is able to exploit disagreements of policy and interest
among the great powers of the Security Council to promote the independent agendas of the U.N.
agencies. To suggest that the Secretariat and the U.N. agencies are not canny bureaucratic and
diplomatic players pursuing their own agendas, quite apart from those of member states, beggars
the imagination.
13 Slaughter discusses the influence of EU models on her own ideas about global governance
at page 134.
14 For examples of this literature from the 1990s, see WOLFGANG H. REINICKE, GLOBAL
PUBLIC POLICY: GOVERNING WITHOUT GOVERNMENT? (1998); Wolfgang H. Reinicke, The
Other World Wide Web: Global Public Policy Networks, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1999–2000, at
44; and R.A.W. Rhodes, The New Governance: Governing Without Government, 44 POL. STUD.
652 (1996).
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for their ability to bring together all public and private actors on issues
critical to the global public interest” (p. 9).15
Global policy networks typically feature a combination of representatives of national governments, international organizations, corporate
and business interests, and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs).
Representative tasks include the creation of standards, regulations,
and best practices with respect to a particular global issue, such as
landmines, human trafficking, development programs for the world’s
poor, the role of multilateral economic actors such as the World Bank
or the International Monetary Fund, or cross-border pollution.16 During the 1990s, however, the concept of global governance was prominently driven by international NGOs, which increasingly flexed their
muscles in areas ranging from human rights to the environment and
increasingly made claims that they “represented” the peoples of the
world in their dealings with governments and international organizations. NGOs recast themselves as “global civil society” to reflect their
increasingly expanded claim to a place at the table in establishing
transborder policies, regulations, and law.17 International organizations such as the U.N. began to support and even court the NGOs, seeing in the NGOs an opportunity to further their own legitimacy.18 The
question that remains is whether governance through such networks
increases or decreases the accountability of government — or governance — to the governed.
6. Liberal Internationalism. — Liberal internationalism is the ideal
that asserts, openly and unapologetically, that true legitimacy rests on
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
15 A footnote has been omitted. Slaughter notes that global policy networks “focus on the
many ways in which private actors now can and do perform government functions, from providing expertise to monitoring compliance with regulations to negotiating the substance of those
regulations, both domestically and internationally” (p. 9). It should be understood that Slaughter’s favorable account of government networks arises in no small part because she agrees that
NGOs and other private actors indeed lack accountability and therefore the legitimacy to participate in the direct decisionmaking and policymaking that advocates of global governance by public-private networks endorse. Her forthright agreement on this crucial issue is a great strength of
the argument and one of the reasons her argument is a serious advance in the intellectual debate
over global governance.
16 For a representative account, see ROBERT O’BRIEN ET AL., CONTESTING GLOBAL
GOVERNANCE: MULTILATERAL ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS AND GLOBAL SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (2000).
17 For an enthusiastic endorsement of these claims, see JOHN KEANE, GLOBAL CIVIL
SOCIETY? (2003). For a less enthusiastic account, see Kenneth Anderson & David Rieff, “Global
Civil Society”: A Sceptical View, in GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 2004/5, at 26 (Mary Kaldor et al.
eds., 2005).
18 I discuss this symbiosis at greater length in Kenneth Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism in
American Foreign Policy: Unsolicited Advice to the Bush Administration on Relations with International Nongovernmental Organizations, 2 CHI. J. INT’L L. 371 (2001) [hereinafter Anderson,
The Limits of Pragmatism]; and Kenneth Anderson, The Ottawa Convention Banning Landmines,
the Role of International Non-governmental Organizations and the Idea of International Civil
Society, 11 EUR. J. INT’L L. 91, 104–20 (2000) [hereinafter Anderson, The Ottawa Convention].
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universal principles and that international, transnational, and supranational institutions can be stewards of such universal principles. Unlike
constitutional democratic sovereignty, liberal internationalism seeks legitimacy not in democracy and popular sovereignty, but rather in universal principles of human rights. Such principles are unattached to
the will of the people, except at the most abstract level in the form of
the assumption that the decisions made on account of those principles
are what the “people” would approve of if they were fully rational,
fully moral human beings. The principles animating liberal internationalism require no real assent from the bottom up for their legitimacy; the model’s legitimacy depends not on consent but on the presumed rightness of its human rights universals. The model presumes
that elites at the top of the global social structure are best qualified to
determine these universal principles and to teach them to and inculcate them in those individuals further down the social hierarchy.19
The model herein described is “liberal” insofar as its human rights
universals often have a liberal content; it is internationalist not in the
sense of multilateralism, but instead in the sense that the universal is
identified with the international, the transnational, and the supranational. At the same time, liberal internationalism is a transformative
ideal. It evinces an understanding that it is necessary to move from
the legitimacy now residing in democratic sovereigns to legitimacy residing in transnational, supranational institutions.20 It begins with a
realistic assessment of where legitimacy exists at this moment, but it
idealizes a transmutation of sovereign state legitimacy, through a
gradual pooling process, into a genuinely transnational, supranational
legitimacy. Liberal internationalism differs from multilateral pooled
sovereignty in that it rejects the convenient ambiguity that allows multilateral pooled sovereignty to slide covertly between democratic sovereignty and human rights universalism as the source of ultimate political legitimacy. Liberal internationalism does, however, share with
multinational pooled sovereignty the understanding that realism requires a transformative path to move from democratic sovereignty to
global federalism. It thus shares with pooled sovereignty a common
theoretical outlook that derives from the theory and experience of, and
that reflects an enthusiasm for, the evolving European Union.21
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
19 For a critique of liberal internationalism as a function of a certain form of top-down universalism, see Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 34–36.
20 A representative example of such thinking within American jurisprudence is Antonio F.
Perez, On the Way to the Forum: The Reconstruction of Article 2(7) and Rise of Federalism Under the United Nations Charter, 31 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353 (1996).
21 Political scientists such as David Held generally take this kind of transformative line. See,
e.g., DAVID HELD ET AL., GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS: POLITICS, ECONOMICS AND
CULTURE 446–52 (1999).
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7. Parliamentary World Government. — The parliamentary world
government model asserts that legitimacy rests — and ought to rest —
with global institutions.22 Although it shares with liberal internationalism an enthusiasm for precisely the world government that Slaughter
rejects as “infeasible and undesirable” (p. 8), parliamentary world government acknowledges that democratic legitimacy matters. The model
attempts to facilitate and preserve democratic legitimacy by calling for
a global parliamentary system, modeled somewhat on the structure of
today’s European Parliament, operating partly parallel to and partly
above existing national legislatures.23
The intent is to create a genuinely federal and democratic global
government. Wherein lies its utopianism. If parliamentary world
government’s most admirable quality is its forthright recognition that
democracy cannot be dispensed with as a value in a federal world,
then its answer is equally forthright but utterly utopian: “Let the
whole planet vote.” As Slaughter says, the “diversity of the peoples to
be governed makes it almost impossible to conceive of a global demos.
No form of democracy within the current global repertoire seems capable of overcoming these obstacles” (p. 8). She is surely correct. And
yet parliamentary world government is both an analytically important
part of the spectrum of possible idealisms and one that is, however
utopian, admirably forthright in its acknowledgment of the essential
value of democracy.
B. “We Are All Idealists Now”
Viewed in one way, the above idealisms form a continuum, running
from one extreme of national sovereignty to another of world government. The move from one to the next is a matter of degree, the gradual ceding of sovereignty from states to international institutions and
the gradual shift from state sovereignty to global government. Viewed
in another way, however, at some point in the continuum there is a
clear break of principle: ought state sovereignty to be supreme or
ought we, instead, to seek a federal world in which state sovereignty
gives way to the legal and political supremacy of global institutions?
The above taxonomy is an elaborated restatement of the dilemma
with which A New World Order grapples. How shall we see sover–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
22 See, e.g., COMM’N ON GLOBAL GOVERNANCE, OUR GLOBAL NEIGHBORHOOD 257
(1995) (“One suggestion widely canvassed is to establish ‘an assembly of the people’ as a deliberative body to complement the General Assembly, which is representative of governments. What is
generally proposed is the initial setting up of an assembly of parliamentarians, consisting of representatives elected by existing national legislatures from among their members, and the subsequent
establishment of a world assembly through direct election by the people.”).
23 See, e.g., Richard Falk & Andrew Strauss, Toward Global Parliament, FOREIGN AFF., Jan.–
Feb. 2001, at 212, 216–20.
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eignty? As that which guarantees democratic accountability to a political community at the level of the nation-state? Or as that which
not only deprives us of the benefits of cooperative global governance,
but also fails to secure for us the benefits of a universal reign of human rights that ought not to depend on democratic majorities for its
enforcement? Or might we frame precisely the same questions in the
obverse: how, instead, shall we see global governance?
A New World Order struggles to find a way out of this dilemma. It
searches for a position on the sovereignty-global governance continuum that captures the benefits of both core ideal positions — democratic sovereignty and liberal internationalism — while avoiding the
disadvantages of each. It is an extraordinarily difficult proposition,
and it is what makes A New World Order such an ambitious book.
Slaughter thus proposes to square what some might have thought
was a circle and, moreover, to do it honestly, without recourse to definitional sleight of hand. Specifically, she eschews the temptation to redefine sovereignty in such a way that, by definition, it no longer
threatens the terms of global governance. A New World Order is,
however, at times drawn to such redefinition and indeed quotes — but
does not assume — precisely such a “de-fanged” definition of sovereignty drawn from legal-political theorists Abram and Antonia Chayes.
This “new sovereignty” is defined as
the capacity to participate in international institutions of all types — in
collective efforts to steer the international system and address global and
regional problems together with their national and supranational counterparts. This is a conception of sovereignty that would accord status and
recognition to states in the international system to the extent that they are
willing and able to engage with other states, and thus necessarily accept
mutual obligations. (p. 267)24

This definition is sovereignty “de-fanged” because it defines sovereignty as acceding to global governance and the rule of others. Accept
this as the definition of sovereignty and nearly all questions of sovereign power and interest disappear into the global collective. Sovereignty, in this case, just is federal global governance, and everything
becomes very, very easy.
While Slaughter’s own instincts run in favor of precisely such a
view of sovereignty, A New World Order nearly always resists the
temptation to avoid doing the hard work simply by a priori definition.
Instead, Slaughter offers this redefinition of sovereignty as the result of
her solution to the governance dilemma. Whether Slaughter’s solution
in fact manages to derive this new form of sovereignty in a way that
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
24 A footnote has been omitted. The author cites ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER
CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY
AGREEMENTS 4 (1995).
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makes it rational for states and political communities to accept it is
another matter, to which we shortly turn. But A New World Order, to
its credit, nearly always concedes that it cannot reach that conclusion
simply by assuming it.
A New World Order correctly acknowledges that the central debate
in international law and politics focuses not on the comparative merits
of realism versus idealism but rather on the governance dilemma and
on what constitutes a defensible position on the sovereignty-global
governance continuum. Realism is as important as ever, in one sense,
but in another sense, realism is servant to the goals articulated by one
or another form of idealism. Put another way, it is true, of course, that
the real and anticipated consequences of actions matter, and power
matters — but in the service of our ideals. Hence, what we identify as
the defensible ideal matters in the first place. Even our moral realists
have enlisted their analyses and prognostications of consequences in
the service of one ideal or another. We are all idealists now.
III. GOVERNMENT NETWORKING IN A NEW WORLD ORDER
A. The Inadequacy of Existing Ideal Solutions
With all of the above said, none of the idealisms described in section II.A is suited to the rigors of A New World Order’s project. Each
fails in some way to avoid being pinned on one of the horns of the
governance dilemma. Consider first the “outlier” positions on the sovereignty-global governance continuum — “sovereignty for its own
sake” and “parliamentary world government.”
According to Slaughter, neither of these two sovereignty positions is
sufficient to secure the benefits that flow from a regime of transnational cooperation that employs a fixed structure of binding rules.
Each sovereign calculating its interests and power alone is not enough
to give us the collective benefits of regulatory cooperation, however
enlightened and farsighted such a sovereign might be (p. 8). Yet at the
other extreme, “parliamentary world government” indulges a fantasy
of planetary democracy (p. 8). Even “liberal internationalism,” to
which Slaughter — in this and other writings — is sometimes drawn,25
is deemed insufficiently respectful both of democracy as a value and of
the accountability to a political community that democracy anchors
(pp. 8–9).
Yet the “interior” positions, too, while each purporting to reconcile
the desire for two potentially conflicting values, are no less problematic in Slaughter’s view. “Sovereign state multilateralism” appears too
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
25

See sources cited supra note 3.
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ad hoc to provide stable cooperative benefits. So-called shifting “coalitions of the willing” might be adequate for narrow special circumstances, such as certain armed conflicts (the Kosovo war, perhaps), but
they are too unstable to serve longer-term interests (p. 265). “Multilateral pooled sovereignty” appears attractive at first sight, but it suffers
from a fatal (and deliberate) ambiguity in its definition that allows it to
claim the benefits of both transnational cooperation and sovereignty
while nevertheless redefining sovereignty in a congenial and unthreatening way (p. 262).
Even “global governance through global policy networks” — the
NGO–private actor alternative and the ideal closest to what A New
World Order has in mind — suffers from a lack of genuinely democratic accountability (p. 9). Slaughter’s rigorous criticism of what she
might otherwise find an attractive solution to the governance dilemma
is worth noting because global governance through policy networks
has been the ideal most pursued in recent years by those drawn to liberal internationalism. The problem with global policy networks,
Slaughter says, lies in ensuring that private actors, including NGOs,
uphold the public interest. She strikingly quotes the conservative
critic John Bolton:
[I]t is precisely the detachment from governments that makes international
civil society so troubling, at least for democracies. . . . [T]he civil society
idea actually suggests a “corporativist” approach to international decisionmaking that is dramatically troubling for democratic theory because it
posits “interests” (whether NGOs or businesses) as legitimate actors along
with popularly elected governments. (p. 9)26

The accountability problem is most acute with respect to NGOs,
which typically define themselves as upholding the public interest and
the common good. No one is surprised that corporations typically advocate the position that is best for their business interests, owners, and
shareholders. But NGOs typically claim the do-gooder’s writ of universal authority based on good intentions, even when NGOs pursue
narrow, single-interest advocacy issues that cannot be said to represent
the “common good” in the way that popularly elected governments —
or for that matter, broad-based political parties — do.27 Martin
Shapiro notes that the shift to the rhetoric of governance betokens “a
significant erosion of the boundaries separating what lies inside a gov-

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
26 Internal quotation marks have been omitted. The author quotes John R. Bolton, Should We
Take Global Governance Seriously?, 1 CHI. J. INT’L L. 205, 217–18 (2000).
27 Thomas Carothers makes this important point about the messy, real-world, “integrative”
function of political parties, versus the moral purity of single-interest advocacy NGOs, in Civil
Society: Think Again, FOREIGN POL’Y, Winter 1999–2000, at 18, 19–23.
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ernment and its administration and what lies outside them.”28 Echoing him, Slaughter warns that the “result [of NGO involvement] is to
advantage ‘experts and enthusiasts,’ the two groups outside government that have the greatest incentive and desire to participate in governance processes” (pp. 9–10). Thus, even when the private participants in governance networks are NGOs rather than obviously selfinterested business entities, the problem remains, as Shapiro puts it,
that “[w]hile the ticket to participation in governance is knowledge
and/or passion, both knowledge and passion generate perspectives that
are not those of the rest of us. Few of us would actually enjoy living
in a Frank Lloyd Wright house.”29
The governance dilemma, Slaughter acknowledges, is even bleaker
than we first thought. Indeed, it is not just a dilemma; it is a “trilemma”: First, we “need global rules” (p. 10). Second, we need global
rules “without centralized power” (p. 10). Third, we need global rules
without centralized power but “with government actors who can be
held to account through a variety of political mechanisms” (p. 10).30
Slaughter proposes “government networks” as a solution to the
trilemma. But what exactly does Slaughter mean by government networks, how does she understand them to solve our governance dilemma (or trilemma), and how will they, unlike other networking solutions, meet Slaughter’s rigorous criteria? This Review turns now to A
New World Order’s internal argument, focusing specifically on the core
concepts of “disaggregated sovereignty” and “horizontal” and “vertical”
government networks.
B. What Are “Government Networks”?
A New World Order aims at the proliferation of government networks. Such proliferation is, says Slaughter, a phenomenon that is
happening now, although it is insufficiently noted or understood by
observers of globalization. But in Slaughter’s view, such a phenomenon is also a highly desirable outcome, one that best resolves the globalization trilemma.
Just as “[t]errorists, arms dealers, money launderers, drug dealers,
traffickers in women and children, and the modern pirates of intellectual property all operate through global networks,” governments increasingly do likewise (p. 1). Slaughter offers as immediate examples
networks of many kinds of regulators and government officials, includ–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
28 Martin Shapiro, Administrative Law Unbounded: Reflections on Government and Governance, 8 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 369, 369 (2001).
29 Id. at 374.
30 Accountability is, as Slaughter correctly notes, a separate consideration from libertarian limits on centralized power. Each may be served by democracy, but they are in fact distinct concerns.
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ing police investigators, financial regulators, and even judges and legislators. These governmental actors, she observes, “increasingly exchange information and coordinate activity to combat global crime
and address common problems on a global scale. These government
networks are a key feature of world order in the twenty-first century,
but they are underappreciated, undersupported, and underused to address the central problems of global governance” (p. 1).
Slaughter offers many examples beyond cross-border law enforcement, antiterrorism, and international security. For example, in the
global economy — interlinked through financial and business ties now
more than ever — “networks of finance ministers and central bankers
have been critical players in responding to national and regional financial crises” (p. 2). In environmental protection, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) “and its Dutch equivalent have
founded the International Network for Environmental Compliance
and Enforcement . . . , which offers technical assistance to environmental agencies around the world” (p. 3).31 In matters of justice and
judiciaries, national judges
are exchanging decisions with one another through conferences, judicial
organizations, and the Internet. Constitutional judges increasingly cite
one another’s decisions on issues from free speech to privacy rights. . . .
Bankruptcy judges in different countries negotiate minitreaties to resolve
complicated international cases; judges in transnational commercial disputes have begun to see themselves as part of a global judicial system.
National judges are also interacting directly with their supranational
counterparts on trade and human rights issues. (p. 3)

Even legislators, “the most naturally parochial government officials[,]
. . . are reaching across borders” (p. 3).
Practically everywhere Slaughter looks, therefore, she sees a proliferation of governmental networks. Such networks have, she says, certain common functions, even across subject matter areas. First, they
“expand regulatory reach” and in effect allow governments to close the
gaps between their jurisdictions (p. 3). Second, they “build trust and
establish relationships” among their participants, “conditions essential
for long-term cooperation” (p. 3). Third, they exchange information
regularly and develop “databases of best practices” (p. 3). Fourth, they
offer “technical assistance and professional socialization to members
from less developed nations” (p. 4). Of these functions, the tendency is
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31 Indeed, the United States provides substantial technical assistance of all sorts through
global networks. Slaughter points out that “[w]hen the official U.S. foreign aid budget is tallied, it
does not include technical assistance from the SEC, the EPA, the Justice Department, or the
Treasury Department. Yet all of these parts of the U.S. government provide growing amounts of
such assistance to their counterparts around the world”; the amount of money poured into such
networks — essentially a transfer from developed to less developed countries — is sizable and
likely to grow (p. 57).
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to focus on the first, the one that seems most “realist” in its assertion of
power over the gaps between legal and national jurisdictions. Slaughter, however, emphasizes (correctly, in my experience) that over the
long term the following phenomena constitute the sine qua non of government networks: the creation of common ties, personal relationships,
camaraderie, a shared professional and social outlook, and an expectation that what others in the network think of what I do in my home
jurisdiction, whether as a judge, regulator, or law enforcement official,
genuinely matters. In short, the most significant effect of global networks might be characterized as the creation of a global bourgeoisie
with a set of similar elite-class views—that is, as a process of socialization, rather than simply a network of one-off transactions.
Conceived this way, the importance of government networks is
perhaps unclear. A New World Order understands these government
networks to play a much more robust role in governance than might
be apparent from the general description provided above. This more
robust conception of government networks can only be deduced
through a closer examination of the various types of global networks.
In the first three chapters of the book, Slaughter distinguishes three
categories of government networks: harmonization networks, enforcement networks, and information networks (although in practice the
three might overlap). Harmonization networks, for example, “contribute to world order by allowing nations to standardize their laws and
regulations in areas where they have determined that it will advance
their common interests in trade, environmental regulation, communications, protecting public health, or any number of other areas” (p.
167). Such networks involve the exercise of genuine regulatory power.
Harmonization networks are far from being merely cross-border talking shops or debating societies because coordination of laws and regulations across borders closes the gap between jurisdictions. Harmonization networks seek to close the regulatory gaps by harmonizing legal
systems across borders, not by establishing a single, supranational law,
but instead by inducing each jurisdiction to accept the same system.
The process is as fundamental and familiar as the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code by the various states of the United States.
Through harmonization networks, states may gain in regulatory reach
but may also lose or at least have to compromise on the nature of the
regime. Harmonization requires harmony. Signing on to a harmonization network means giving up the privilege of dissonance so long as
one remains in, and benefits from, the network.
Enforcement networks, by contrast, “contribute to world order by
helping nations enforce law they have individually or collectively determined to serve the public good” (p. 167). Enforcement networks, in
other words, enforce the laws created by harmonization networks.
The most obvious examples of enforcement networks occur in the area
of criminal law enforcement. Raiding internet distributors of child
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pornography, for example, requires coordinated arrests in order to capture the entire criminal web and to preserve the evidence necessary to
obtain convictions. Outside the criminal law context, tax regulations,
accounting standards, and cross-border riparian rights, among others,
all implicate enforcement networks.
Information networks, for their part, contribute to world order by
allowing maximization of efficient and rational decisionmaking in
various substantive matters. Information networks are perhaps easiest
to conceptualize in the case of scientific knowledge. Knowing the etiology of HIV-AIDS, for example, is a universal ground of rational decisionmaking; even if the political and social response must be calibrated to local culture, the knowledge of physical processes is
universal and universally relevant. Information networks allow the
rapid production and diffusion of such knowledge. Yet surprisingly,
information networks may be sources of potent conflict. This is particularly true when the issue at stake involves the legitimacy of social
practices or government, rather than scientific information. Although,
as Slaughter says, scholars “tend to assume automatically that more information is better,” those concerned with the legitimacy of a political
system and its decisions may be far more “concerned with the source
of particular information — from within a particular polity, constituted by the people of a specific nation, or from abroad,” than they are
with its content (pp. 167–68).32
Why? If one is talking not about universal knowledge (laws of
physical science, for example) but instead about information in the social sense (which can include judicial decisions from other jurisdictions, model legal codes from other places, and cultural models in the
form of media content), then the legitimacy and the social, cultural, political, and legal provenance of that “information” is the issue far more
than is its content. It might be true that I would be, in fact, a better
president than any given candidate for office — but, of course, that
“fact” is not the issue, while the legitimate process of becoming president is. Or, to give another example, there are obvious legitimacy issues with the proposition that the United States should adopt a ruling
of the German Constitutional Court, even if the German ruling appears to be a better way of doing things.
Curiously, therefore, as Slaughter points out, the seemingly most
benign and least coercive type of government network, information
networks, might actually invoke the most serious issues of political legitimacy. Whether information networks produce legitimate outcomes
depends on how actors within the networks deal with the information
and with one another. Slaughter observes that there often is network
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
32

Emphasis has been added.
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pressure for convergence of practices, which may or may not create a
result that is legitimate within a particular political context and society
(pp. 171–72). She also notes, however, that there is the possibility of
what she calls “informed divergence,” in which those “who are purportedly on the receiving end” of information may “choose to continue
to diverge from the model being purveyed, but do so self-consciously,
with an appreciation of their own reasons” (p. 172). So, for example, a
central bank may choose not to follow the network model of a certain
monetary policy during a financial crisis, for essentially political reasons, but at least it will do so with clear knowledge of what the financial consequences are likely to be.
The combined effect of all three categories of government networks
is to “marry soft with hard power” (p. 168).33 This insight is deft, and
one that I would put somewhat more strongly by describing government networks as mechanisms for the conversion of soft power into
hard power. The power within networks themselves is, Slaughter says,
soft power, and even when “the supranational entity has formal legal
authority over its national counterpart, it has no actual means of enforcing the obligation” (p. 168). Instead, the supranational entity
“must use everything from expertise to endearments” (p. 168) to convince member nations to fall into line. “Once convinced of a particular
path of action,” however, national government officials “possess hard
power to make things happen” (pp. 168–69).
This sketch of what A New World Order understands government
networks to do is necessarily incomplete. Yet an essential element
driving A New World Order’s model of government networks still
awaits description — the distinctive functions of what Slaughter calls
“horizontal” and “vertical” networks, and their respective roles in the
process of turning soft power into coercive hard power.
C. Horizontal and Vertical Government Networks
Government networks need not be categorized only as harmonization networks, enforcement networks, or information networks. Another way of categorizing the same government networks is as “horizontal” or “vertical.” Distinguishing analytically between horizontal
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
33 The author draws upon Joseph S. Nye, Jr.’s celebrated distinction in THE PARADOX OF
AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE (2002).
Hard power, for Nye, is “command power that can be used to induce others to change their position” (p. 168) (quoting NYE, supra, at 8) (internal quotation marks omitted). Soft power, by contrast, “flows from the ability to convince others that they want what you want. It is exercised
through setting agendas and holding up examples that other nations seek to follow” (p. 168).
Though hardly a realist, I am skeptical that soft power means quite as much as promoters of the
distinction would urge, at least outside the civilized, urbane, and quintessentially “soft” precincts
of the European Union.
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and vertical networks is crucial for the function that A New World Order envisions for government networks to play. The former is essentially about coordination and the latter essentially about coercion.
1. Horizontal “Networks of Networks” and Coordination. — Horizontal government networks involve networks of government officials
of different countries coordinating their work across borders. Such
networks can be described as “horizontal” because their activities occur among regulators at the same hierarchical level within their own
national structure. A New World Order concentrates on horizontal
networks in a more particular sense, as “networks of networks.”
Drawing on information technology theory, a network of networks
takes advantage of “network effects” — the efficiencies gained by linking together more and more networks — to optimize the exchange of
information and the coordination of policy and action.
A New World Order gives several examples of such government
networks of networks. One is the Financial Stability Forum, which
was formed in 1996 as a joint venture of the Basel Committee, the International Organization of Securities Commissioners (IOSCO), and
the International Association of Insurance Supervisors (IAIS) — each a
government network. The Forum is “composed of senior bank, insurance, and securities supervisors from thirteen countries, with the EU
Commission attending in an observer capacity” (p. 135). The Financial Stability Forum has issued papers that, presumably, facilitated international coordination on matters such as capital adequacy for financial institutions and information sharing between financial
conglomerate regulators (p. 135). Another example, also in the international financial field, is the Year 2000 Network. Created by the Basel
Committee, the Bank of International Settlements (BIS) Committee on
Payment and Settlement Systems, the IOSCO, and the IAIS, with a
secretariat supplied by the BIS, its mission was to “encourage the development of coordinated national strategies to address the Year 2000
problem” (p. 136). Slaughter notes that this network of networks was
remarkable in the speed and sophistication with which it addressed the
Y2K problem; it created guidelines, common standards, and global coordination all within a mere six months (p. 136). “It is difficult,” she
adds, to “imagine the global community doing anything that fast or
that effectively through the traditional machinery of international negotiations or even through traditional international institutions” (p.
136).
True enough. Yet we ought to be cautious in generalizing from
such examples. For instance, it may have been the nature of the Y2K
problem that made possible such a speedy, sophisticated, and coordinated response. Y2K was not a matter in which policies would produce winners and losers — all would gain by cooperating. Put another
way, because Y2K responses protected networks, no one had an interest in losing the benefits of network effects, least of all the wealthier
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and larger countries. Indeed, the success of global cooperation to address Y2K may have been due to the characteristics of the problem,
rather than to anything about the networks created to solve it.
In addition to financial networks, A New World Order provides
many examples of different kinds of horizontal networks responding to
different kinds of problems. But these examples elicit a different
worry: how to determine whether these government networks are actually solving problems or merely talking about problems, writing reports, suggesting standards, holding meetings, socializing, and so on.
National governments, international agencies, and large corporations
are all subject to bureaucratic ossification, which leads such entities to
consume ever greater resources that may or may not be justified by the
quantity or quality of the entities’ outputs. Why should the phenomenon of government networks be any different? And how does one
measure outputs so as to evaluate whether the networks are actually
contributing anything?
Slaughter acknowledges the latter question: how do we know that
government networks “actually have, or will have, any impact on addressing the problems that the world needs to solve” (p. 23)? She suggests that government networks contribute to world order “by creating
convergence and informed divergence” with respect to particular practices “by improving compliance with international rules” and by increasing international cooperation (p. 24). She does not, however, present sufficiently persuasive empirical evidence to support her
conclusions. Moreover, it is not clear that achievement of these goals
proves actual “ground-level” results, since Slaughter does not show
how such goals improve actual lives on a global scale.34
Rather than providing evidence of both the costs and the benefits
of networks, A New World Order often resorts to conclusory statements
like the following: “[T]he Commonwealth is emerging as much the
most appropriate and effective type of international organization in existence” (p. 137).35 This assessment of whether the Commonwealth is
a model for horizontal government networks is by the former chairman of the British House of Commons All-Party Committee on Foreign Affairs. Perhaps this is a keenly accurate assessment, but it
would be helpful to know if the Commonwealth had actually been a
great waste of resources and a bureaucratic sinkhole. To be fair, A
New World Order is often candid in its assessment of networks’ ac–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
34 Slaughter candidly notes the difficulty in supplying empirical proof (p. 170). I agree with
her that the heterogeneity of the examples makes it hard to provide such proof of outcomes. Also,
it is probably too early in many developing networks to determine how effective they have been
and will be.
35 The author quotes David Howell, The Place of the Commonwealth in the International Order, 345 ROUND TABLE 29 (1988).
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complishments, noting, for example, that the Commonwealth’s Ministerial Action Group for violations of human rights, democracy, and
good governance “did not, in truth, accomplish much [in its early
years] beyond monitoring progress toward the restoration of democracy in countries such as Nigeria and Sierra Leone” (p. 138).
A New World Order’s discussion of the Ministerial Action Group
exemplifies how the book often misses opportunities to address the
challenges and costs of network activity. Monitoring is certainly a
positive output of networks. The accumulation of monitoring activities has pressured governments in some places to boost human rights
and to hold reasonably fair and transparent elections. Elections in
such places as Peru, the Philippines, and South Africa at moments of
transition have benefited enormously from outside monitoring.36 Even
in places where electoral fraud or massive unfairness has occurred,
such as Zimbabwe, a denunciation by a respected outside voice alerts
the world not to accept the announced results.37 But networks like the
Ministerial Action Group can face unique problems stemming from
their being blessed and backed by sovereign states, some of which
have considerable economic and political heft and all of which are, to
varying extents, self-interested. Slaughter could say more about the
difficulties of network multilateralism, whether in organizations such
as the Commonwealth or the U.N., in addressing serious and persistent problems of human rights and democracy. She would, for instance, have to address the problems of what we might call “corrupt
networks,” a good example of which is the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, which has session after session been filled to the brim
with human rights abusers who, after all, have the greatest incentive
to join.38 To be truly persuasive, A New World Order would have to
account more thoroughly for not only the benefits but also the problems and the costs of networks — particularly corrupt ones.
Far more common throughout the book than accounts of the successes of horizontal coordinating networks in the real world are de–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
36 See, e.g., Andrew F. Cooper & Thomas Legler, A Model for the Future?, J. DEMOCRACY,
Oct. 2001, at 123 (Peru); Thomas Carothers, The Observers Observed, J. DEMOCRACY, July 1997,
at 17, 18 (Philippines).
37 See Editorial, Putting Pressure on Mugabe, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 22, 2003, § 1, at 30.
38 The presence on the Commission of such countries as Sudan, China, and Cuba, and the exclusion of the United States from the Commission in 2002, reflect the dilemma the U.N. faces in
its human rights efforts. Inviting the foxes to guard the chicken coop and maintaining that there
is no real distinction between foxes and chickens might civilize the foxes and help them behave
better. Of course, once in the chicken coop the foxes may feast. In my view, the inclusion approach has resulted in corrupt international networks, which helped to create tragedies in Darfur
and Rwanda. Slaughter believes that the growing influence of government networks, dominated
by the resources and soft power of “good guys,” will help cure corruption; I confess to serious
doubt.
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scriptions of bureaucratic outputs. Networks held meetings, wrote papers, made recommendations, and drafted statements. To be sure, this
is what networks must do in order to create successful outcomes in
which network members go back to their own operations and implement now-coordinated policies. Yet unfortunately this is also precisely
the procedure followed when networks create unsuccessful outcomes.
Thus, distinguishing between effective networks and bureaucratic
blackholes may prove difficult. Information, as Slaughter notes in another context, does not always translate into results; we scholars think
of it as a good for its own sake, but in many contexts, it is not (pp.
167–68). Thus, it cannot be assumed that government networks result
in positive real-world change.
I emphasize that I am genuinely agnostic on this question of
whether horizontal networks achieve results, measured not by bureaucratic activity, but by real-world change. A New World Order does not
provide clear evidence across the board of the actual benefits of government networks; the evidence that it presents stops one and sometimes two layers short, often proving only that government networks
exist or that such networks engage in or sustain bureaucratic activities.
Concededly, measuring the final outputs is a very difficult empirical
task. It is obviously not enough to measure results on the basis of
what the networks themselves did as bureaucracies. Nor is it enough
to take the word of actors who tend to share a bias either for or
against such networks. On the other hand, it is hard for me not to believe, based on anecdotal evidence from Slaughter’s work and from my
own work with international actors, that horizontal networks often do
produce important coordination results. It is hard for me to believe
that coordinated responses in financial crises, for example, by central
banks do not help control crises that would otherwise get much, much
worse. Similarly, it is hard for me to accept that criminal law enforcement and antiterrorism activity are not enhanced by coordination
across borders. A New World Order is fundamentally a book documenting the existence of government networks; their ultimate effectiveness in the world is another question, and one that is, as an empirical matter, in many instances probably fiendishly difficult to answer.
2. “Vertical” Networks and Coercion. — Horizontal networks are
fundamentally about coordination of information, policy, and action.
They are “looser and less coercive — even aspirationally — than other
forms of international organization. They thus guarantee that power
remains principally in the hands of nation-states through their national
officials” (p. 145). But horizontal networks are not, according to A
New World Order, the only type of government network. There are
also “vertical” government networks, which seek to infuse supranational organizations, such as international criminal tribunals, adjudicatory bodies of the World Trade Organization, and other trade groups,
with the coercive powers of national governments. What makes verti-
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cal government networks “vertical” is that they mediate between national government actors and supranational entities.
Vertical government networks are fundamentally, as A New World
Order describes them, about coercion. Vertical networks “can be the
critical ingredient that gives a supranational organization real power”
(p. 145). This is because vertical networks give to supranational organizations the ability to compel and direct the coercive powers of national agencies with which they are networked. Thus, “[t]he possibility
of direct relations between a supranational court and national courts,
or between a supranational regulatory agency and its domestic equivalent, pierces the shell of state sovereignty and creates a channel
whereby supranational officials can harness the coercive power of national officials” (p. 145).
I shall return later to the question of what it means to “pierce[] the
shell of state sovereignty.” For now, it is enough to note that when
Slaughter describes a vertical network and its coercive possibilities, she
does not mean that a supranational organization can command a sovereign state to use its coercive power — power that, in the nature of
multilateral politics, might not be given by a ministry of foreign affairs
or approved by a legislature. Instead, Slaughter understands a vertical
network as one in which an agency of the sovereign, acting on such
authority as it already has (or takes itself to have), puts the sovereign’s
coercive powers behind the supranational organization. Thus, when
members of the EU sought to create the single market or when members of NAFTA sought to ensure the recourse of foreign investors
against governments, they created vertical networks by transferring a
“measure of their sovereignty to a supranational court or arbitral tribunal, empowering the judges or arbitrators to make legally binding
decisions with which the parties to the dispute in question are expected to comply” (p. 146). The coercive mechanism of a vertical government network thus becomes clear: it is to make individual government institutions “responsible for the implementation of rules created
by a supranational institution” (p. 132). If under traditional international law such rules, if they bind a state at all, bind the whole sovereign state (which, in accordance with its sovereignty, can choose how
to comply with those rules internally) (p. 132), then “[v]ertical government networks make it possible for a supranational court, regulatory
entity, or parliament to create a relationship with its national counterparts to make those rules directly enforceable” (pp. 132–33).
The coercion of vertical government networks runs against two different kinds of actors. First, putting the power of national governmental agencies behind a supranational agency enables it to confront thirdparty actors. Perhaps the most important example of such a vertical
network is one that, curiously, A New World Order does not mention
— the U.N. Security Council. The Security Council has no armies of
its own; its ability to enforce its will is entirely a function of the will-
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ingness of its members to provide the coercive muscle. When members do so, they and the Security Council satisfy the requirements of a
vertical government network.
However, the real importance of vertical government networks, in
Slaughter’s account, lies in directing coercive power in a quite different direction. This coercion occurs when the power of vertical government networks is directed not against a third party, but against a
member government of the network itself by using the power of a constitutive part or regulatory agency of that very sovereign member.
Member states of vertical government networks may, therefore, get
more than they bargained for. Indeed, if the state is unaware that its
administrative subagency or court system has decided on its own authority to join the network, then it may not have bargained for anything at all and yet still find itself facing the coercive power, not of the
supranational entity directly, but of its own government agency.
One might pause to ask how this can be, since a subagency of a
government, for example a regulatory agency, would not appear to
have the power to compel its own sovereign state. The answer is easiest to see with courts, which in modern democratic systems act independently of the government and can even compel the sovereign, at
least in certain types of cases. If a court system, or perhaps just a
lower court, concludes that it has the power, and maybe the obligation,
to enforce the decisions or rules of a supranational actor, then either
the sovereign complies or a constitutional crisis may ensue. Even in
the United States — which, because of its size, power, and long tradition of internal constitutional fidelity, is one of the democracies in the
world most resistant to following the rules of supranational actors — it
is not impossible to imagine a federal judge deciding that he or she has
the authority to freeze or turn over the assets of an accused war criminal to an international tribunal, or even to order the surrender of an
accused foreigner to an adjudicatory body such as the Security Council–created tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.39 Relatedly, even in the United States, bureaucracies frequently possess administrative hearing powers that permit them to bind the government
in certain circumstances. It is administrative law territory that has
been established in treaties such as those creating NAFTA or the
WTO; for Western European governments engaged in the process of
creating “ever closer union” through the EU, the power of bureaucracies to bind states is an entirely ordinary state of affairs. It is not at all
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 The Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000), in coordination with the orders of an international tribunal, might be deployed for some tort actions of this kind. That statute’s future evolution is difficult to predict following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004), which is noteworthy for its lack of clear guidance amidst many platitudinous admonitions of caution.
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absurd to think that vertical government networks can sometimes operate coercively against a sovereign state through the actions of that
state’s own agencies.
In fact, A New World Order envisions a concept of vertical government networks and their coercive powers that is even more radical
than the preceding examples indicate. A New World Order asserts that
vertical networks do not involve an agency of the sovereign ordering
about the sovereign, but instead involve one agency of the state ordering about another agency of the state. This conception of vertical
networks assumes that agencies can order about other agencies
because there really is no overarching sovereign state. Slaughter
observes:
The direct interaction of a supranational institution and a national government institution pierces the shell of sovereignty that formally defines
the state as a unitary actor in the international system. It penetrates the
domestic political system, working to command or persuade not the government as a whole, but rather one government institution that has power
with regard to other government institutions according to the rules of the
domestic political game. (p. 146)40

This observation takes us to the critical premise of A New World
Order, the “disaggregated state.”41 But let us dwell a little more on
vertical government networks as such. Because the “coercive power of
vertical networks is much greater than that of horizontal networks[,] it
is thus not surprising that they are much harder to find” (p. 133). With
respect to “third party–directed” vertical government networks, such
as the Security Council, the paucity of such arrangements might be
due to free rider and other collective action problems inherent in multilateral action, especially in matters involving the use of force. With
respect to actions that are directed at member-states, matters are more
complex. Why would a sovereign allow itself to be bound in this way?
One answer that Slaughter provides is that the sovereign stands to
gain much more over the long term from playing by the rules, including rules of arbitration and decision, than it does in the short term
from breaking them. So, according to Slaughter, in some cases,
governments will in fact choose to delegate some functions to an independent organization, whether to solve a collective action problem, tie
their hands, or compensate for their own domestic incapacity or the incapacity of other countries. When they do so choose, they will want the organization to actually work. They will thus either establish a vertical
network directly or create the structural conditions for the emergence of
one. (p. 145)

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
40
41

Emphasis has been added.
See infra Part IV.
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In other types of cases, however, sovereigns, or institutional parts of
sovereigns, may find that their hands are tied without their knowledge
and without the consent of the democratically accountable branches of
government — what Slaughter calls, perhaps understatedly, “according
to the rules of the domestic political game” (p. 146). Such cases often
involve adjudicatory mechanisms and administrative agencies —
courts and bureaucracies — that operate against not just any institution of the state, but principally against the democratically accountable
branches of government, that is, legislatures and elected executives.42
A New World Order’s innovative uses of vertical government networks
mostly — though perhaps not always — involve endowing democratically unaccountable supranational entities with the coercive powers of
democratically unaccountable national institutions so as to allow such
powers to be used against the democratically accountable institutions
of the state. Later, I shall develop this observation as a point of critique, but even in describing the nature of vertical government networks, it seems to me that A New World Order — a book that is on
nearly all counts very careful to be plain about the bottom lines of
power and accountability — might have been clearer about such an
important matter.
Slaughter is well aware that the machinery of vertical government
networks can easily undermine the delicate balance that her book
states as its goal — avoiding impalement on any of the horns of the
trilemma with the effect of losing the benefits of global governance,
undermining democracy, and undercutting democratic accountability.
But her response is curiously impotent and her locution curiously telling: “Given a presumed aspiration to avoid world government,” she
says, “the power of vertical government networks should be used sparingly” (p. 145).
Used sparingly by whom? One might conclude by logical necessity
that if there is an institution that ought to use such power sparingly, it
likewise has the possibility to use it unsparingly. Charitably, one might
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
42 Slaughter does cite the example of the European Parliament (EP), stating that it “is developing direct relationships with national legislators, which should ultimately strengthen its position
against the executive and even the judicial branches of the European Union” (p. 147). Slaughter’s
claim about the legitimacy of the EU being strengthened by the EP is unpersuasive since it assumes, to start, that the EP has some genuinely strong democratic legitimacy. Moreover, it expresses an expectation that sounds more like a hope that the EP will strengthen its position vis-àvis the democratically unaccountable and overwhelmingly powerful bureaucratic and judicial
institutions of the EU. The EP does not disprove the proposition that vertical government networks rely on and exploit the power of unelected and unaccountable bureaucrats and courts. A
New World Order would be more powerful, if more controversial, if it admitted directly that vertical government networks involve bureaucracies and unelected judiciaries doing an end-run
around, if not simply curtailing, the power of democratically accountable branches of
government.

ANDERSON - BOOKPROOFS

01/16/05 – 6:06 PM

BOOK REVIEW

2005]

1283

interpret the decisionmakers to be democratic national governments,
who ought to be chary of approving participation in such vertical networks, because they might get “more than they bargained for.” Uncharitably, but perhaps more convincingly, one might interpret the decisionmakers to be either supranational institutions, able to decide to
coerce democratic sovereigns, or alternatively, national bureaucratic or
judicial institutions, able to decide to take advantage both of their lack
of democratic accountability and of the privilege of coercing their own
sovereign. The possibility of creating a certain privileged position for
democratically unaccountable actors, whether supranational or
national, over democratically accountable ones, is far from merely
residual.
IV. DISAGGREGATED STATES, DISAGGREGATED SOVEREIGNTY,
AND A DISAGGREGATED WORLD ORDER
In A New World Order, the very possibility of government networks, whether horizontal or vertical, as a form of global governance
depends on a key premise, a claim that underlies nearly everything
else. Once this claim is accepted as a crucial insight into the nature of
international political order, the role and growth of government networks becomes at least descriptively plausible — whether one agrees
normatively with the functions Slaughter assigns them, and whether
one agrees that this mechanism of governance manages to avoid impalement on the horns of the trilemma. If, however, this claim is rejected as a description of how the world works, or is beginning to
work, then the ingenious machinery of government networks as a
means of governance largely loses its point.
A. The Disaggregated State and the Unitary Fiction
So what, then, is Slaughter’s critical claim? Foundational to A
New World Order is the claim that the unitary sovereign state is a fiction. The unitary state is a simplifying construct useful for certain
analytic purposes, but it is not descriptive of the real world of states.
Slaughter explains:
[The concept of] the unitary state . . . has long dominated international legal and political analysis. International lawyers and international relations theorists have always known that the entities they describe and analyze as “states” interacting with one another are in fact much more
complex entities, but the fiction of a unitary will and capacity for action
has worked well enough for purposes of description and prediction of outcomes in the international system.
....
The result is the willful adoption of analytical blinders, allowing us to
see the “international system” only in the terms that we ourselves have
imposed. (pp. 12–13)
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A New World Order posits that what we call “sovereign states” are
in fact far from unitary entities that speak with one voice and behave
as single actors; instead, they are collections of different institutions,
agencies, and power structures that speak with different institutional
voices and act according to different mandates. A New World Order
names this condition the “disaggregated state” (p. 12). The term captures Slaughter’s view that the state is not unitary, indeed not even an
“aggregation”; instead, it is a disaggregated collection of disparate institutions that have their own powers, mandates, incentives, motivations, and, crucially, abilities to interact directly with a variety of institutions — which sometimes are their homologues — in other states
and international organizations based on their own power, legitimacy,
and authority, without recourse to any higher authority (pp. 12–13).
Slaughter urges us to consider the descriptive case for the
“disaggregated state” by analogy to how we think about domestic
government:
We call it “the government,” but we can simultaneously distinguish the activities of the courts, Congress, regulatory agencies, and the White House
itself. We do not choose to screen out everything except what the president does or says, or what Congress does or says, or what the Supreme
Court does or says. But effectively, in the international system, we do. (p.
13)

Each institution of government, according to Slaughter, thus has its
own power, legitimacy, and authority. Each is able to act within a certain scope without recourse to other institutions of government. And
in the view of A New World Order, this scope is sufficient to allow a
wide variety of actors — not just the elected branches of government,
but also the unelected branches43 — independent power, legitimacy,
and authority to interact with both coordinating horizontal networks
and coercive vertical networks. Thinking about states as “aggregations of distinct institutions with separate roles and capacities[] provides a lens that allows us to see a new international landscape. Government networks pop up everywhere” (p. 13).
1. Horizontal Networks and the Disaggregated State. — (a) National Regulatory and Administrative Agencies, Horizontal Networks,
and the Disaggregated State. — The disaggregated state is the condition in which horizontal and vertical government networks can thrive.
This Review has described horizontal, coordinating networks as national governmental actors meeting, coordinating, and reaching common positions with their homologues or functionally related actors in
other jurisdictions, perhaps with a coordinating secretariat. The as–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
43 The “unelected branches” include the judiciary as well as bureaucratic agencies that are, as
a matter of constitutional conception, part of and answerable to the executive but that are not
formally a “branch” of government.
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sumption behind such horizontal networks is that these actors already
have the legal power and authority — as well as the will and initiative
— to enter into such relationships across borders. Clearly, at least in
many cases, the legal authority exists, in that the courts have sustained
or would sustain the authority of an agency to work with its
cross-border counterparts on matters within its regulatory sphere. A
New World Order seems to take that authority as evidence not just
of the existence of horizontal government networks, but also of a
higher abstraction: partial evidence for the existence of a disaggregated
state.
In my view, however, the legal theory behind the ability of regulatory agencies to operate across borders is not that the state is disaggregated and therefore that regulatory bureaucrats have the intrinsic
power to coordinate with their foreign counterparts. It is, rather, that
the executive branch, of which the bureaucrats are a part, has the ability to set, on behalf of the unitary government of the United States, the
terms on which such bureaucrats deal with their homologues abroad,
including the ability to limit, curtail, or withdraw such authority. A
New World Order reads into U.S. jurisprudence a concept of regulatory and agency independence that is, on the one hand, contrary to the
history of U.S. constitutional and administrative law and, on the other,
something of a wishful import from European traditions that are more
deeply obedient to the independent authority of bureaucracy.44 Certainly it is true that some American scholars of administrative law
have been devising theories of administrative law and jurisdiction
compatible with — and in some cases considerably more radical than
— the network approach of A New World Order.45 But the mainstream tradition of American legal approaches to state bureaucracy
continues to be that administrative legitimacy is achieved through the
legitimacy of either the democratically accountable executive46 or the
democratically accountable legislature.47
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
44 See, e.g., Lee A. Casey & David B. Rivkin, Jr., Europe in the Balance: The Alarmingly Undemocratic Drift of the European Union, POL’Y REV., June–July 2001, at 41.
45 Paul Berman’s work on jurisdiction comes to mind; it supports, however, a globalized view
of jurisdiction that goes considerably further than Slaughter’s book does. See Paul Schiff Berman, The Globalization of Jurisdiction, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 490–512 (2002).
46 See, e.g., Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make policy choices . . . .”); Cass
R. Sunstein, Is Tobacco a Drug? Administrative Agencies as Common Law Courts, 47 DUKE L.J.
1013, 1056 (1998) (“Chevron emphasizes[ that] the President is generally in charge of [agencies’]
policy judgments, and hence agencies have a kind of democratic pedigree . . . .”); see also Elena
Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–2347 (2001).
47 See, e.g., Barry R. Weingast & Mark J. Moran, Bureaucratic Discretion or Congressional
Control? Regulatory Policymaking by the Federal Trade Commission, 91 J. POL. ECON. 765, 767
(1983).
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(b) National Judiciaries, Horizontal Networks of Judges, and the
Disaggregated State. — The assumption that already existing, independent governmental actors enter into direct relations with their foreign counterparts in horizontal networks is even plainer in the case of
the judiciary. The judiciary is an institution on which A New World
Order rests many hopes for the cause of global governance. Indeed —
at least to this admittedly skeptical American reviewer who is unabashedly in favor of a strong notion of democratic sovereignty — the
book sometimes reads as a plea directed specially at judges and at the
U.S. Supreme Court Justices above all. It urges global governance by
exhorting networks of judges to use the power of the judiciary to order
about even the state. A New World Order makes an explicit call for a
globalist socialization of judges, to get them to think of themselves as
part of a benevolent, paternal, global fraternity: Slaughter wants
judges to “feel part of a larger judicial community,” a network “tied
together not only by the awareness of foreign courts and decisions,”
but also by active engagement in “transjudicial dialogue on common
problems ranging from privacy to the death penalty” (p. 101).
It is striking, however, that A New World Order specifically mentions privacy and the death penalty as paradigmatic of the kinds of
“common problems” judges should discuss as part of their socialization
process into this global fraternity.48 There is no doubt they should discuss these problems, and at length. Yet these are issues that in the end
are inextricably tied to a particular culture, society, and history — that
is, to issues of values that are fundamental to a political community,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
48 A New World Order discusses not just constitutional issues, which so frequently implicate
questions of values, but also the intensely practical matters of comity, forum, and jurisdiction in
commercial cases. The latter discussion is a persuasive one, detailed in its consideration of the
important and unavoidable results of globalization. I do not dwell on that discussion here because I want to focus on matters on which I find the argument less persuasive and more controversial. Nevertheless, one of the important and laudable points of Slaughter’s discussion of commercial cases is that she scrupulously avoids the temptation, succumbed to by much of
comparative constitutional discussion, to generalize from commercial cases to value-driven cases.
I use the term “temptation” because it suggests, quite problematically, that one can usefully deal
with the values questions on the same basis as one deals with commercial issues. For an example
of a theory that does fall prey to this “temptation,” see Posting of Lawrence Solum, Jackson v.
Posner on the Authority of the Decisions of Foreign Tribunals, at http://lsolum.blogspot.com/
archives/2004_06_01_lsolum_archive.html (June 22, 2004). Solum raises the question of how the
U.S. Supreme Court should deal, if at all, with the decisions of foreign tribunals; he suggests
briefly that it might be helpful to begin by thinking about how the Court should deal with international commercial law cases and go from there. I think Solum gets it quite backwards. The
intrinsic feature of hard constitutional law cases is the values question, which is precisely what is
missing from typical commercial law cases; this distinction explains why compromise and efficiency arguments are so persuasive in commercial matters. For instance, I imagine that we would
not think that a case involving trafficking in women and children is best and first understood by
analogizing to trade in goods or trade at all. The moral dimension, not the trade dimension, is allimportant for the legal issue — notwithstanding that we cannot understand the nature of such
trafficking without understanding the economic incentives involved.
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however much informed by discourse with outsiders.49 The death
penalty is not, after all, a problem “common” to all countries. It is,
rather, a U.S. practice,50 which happens to be deeply offensive to the
sensibilities of European elites. To characterize it as a common problem comes perilously close to assuming the conclusion, drawn by elite
Europeans, that the practice is not acceptable. Overreliance on global
networks of judges invites the unelected judiciary to make decisions
that undermine democratic legitimacy and accountability.
Perhaps Slaughter would argue that this concern about unelected
officials’ usurping the power of the elected branches is overblown, that
the type of dangerous and potentially coercive networks described
above do not fit into her definition of “government networks.” But
then consider whether there could be any international network that
would be counted as a government network within the meaning of A
New World Order’s ideal of global governance. For instance, the
United States could gather together networks of pro–death penalty
countries, including prosecutors and judges, if it were to endorse bringing back the death penalty in Western Europe. I doubt very much
that such a narrowly defined network would count as a government
network for purposes of global governance; it would be ruled out by
definitional fiat.
If true, such a scenario raises the disturbing possibility that on
questions of the fundamental values of a political community, the networks that count as networks of global governance turn out to be only
those that essentially subscribe to Western European norms, rather
than to American norms (let alone the norms of others).51 Indeed,
there seems to be no example of a government network that champions any widely held U.S. value as against those held by Europeans; yet
examples such as the death penalty, which run in favor of European
values and against American ones, are prominent.52
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
49 But see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (casting federalism and state sovereignty as a “common legal problem” to which the Court could turn to other
jurisdictions for examples of possible solutions).
50 Of course, there are other countries, such as Japan, that also have capital punishment.
51 More precisely, they are Western European norms as perceived by politically progressive,
Europhile Americans. While Slaughter describes, for example, U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence as an “outlier” position in comparative constitutional law, nowhere does she discuss abortion. However, when measured against secular Western European legal norms — let alone those
of the rest of the world, including the Muslim and Latin American worlds — the standard of Roe
v. Wade is just as much an “outlier”; Western Europe, while permitting abortion, has imposed
many intermediate requirements that have been struck down in the United States. See MARY
ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW: AMERICAN FAILURES,
EUROPEAN CHALLENGES 15–24 (1987).
52 I stress values as distinguished from merely economic issues; I leave aside debates such as
whether government networks tend to favor U.S. or EU approaches to competition law, corporate
governance, or securities regulation.
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For that matter, I have looked in vain in A New World Order for
any recognition of global governance status for government networks
among Muslim states that might be seeking to promote practices and
values that the secular West can hardly view with equanimity, such as
the subservience of women, the imposition of Shari’a law in a wider
and wider range of countries, and the dismantling of the wall between
church and state.53 My concern here is internal consistency: why
should such fundamentalist values not be considered as legitimate expressions of global governance as the heroically progressive, secular,
and Western examples offered by A New World Order? Are Muslim
states not also participants — and is Shari’a law not an important
growing participant — in what Slaughter calls an emerging “global jurisprudence” (p. 243)?54 Shall we wait for Justice Breyer, for example,
to cite approvingly Shari’a law in a future opinion on gender discrimination, perhaps in a matter of how many female witnesses are needed
to disprove a male witness, to uphold state criminal laws against adultery, or to strike down criminal laws against polygamy? Or even to
cite it disapprovingly, while yet “distinguishing” it — in both senses,
alas, of that term?55
Thus, when it comes to the death penalty, free expression and the
First Amendment, or the International Criminal Court (ICC), it appears that widely held, democratically enacted expressions of Ameri–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
53 I am unapologetically unsympathetic to making a place at the table, in the name of a misconceived multiculturalism, for a system that is so obviously hostile to universal human rights
values and to secular democracy. Mark Steyn has best expressed my own view. See generally
Mark Steyn, We Still Don’t Get It, THE SPECTATOR, Sept. 11, 2004, at 14.
54 This omission is curious, as Slaughter has written approvingly elsewhere on the virtue of
international tribunals in terrorism cases reserving places specifically for Muslim judges — that
is, for judges officially qualified by their religion to sit on a court. See Anne-Marie Slaughter,
Editorial, Terrorism and Justice, FIN. TIMES (London), Oct. 12, 2001, at 23. I criticize this approach in Kenneth Anderson, What To Do with Bin Laden and Al Qaeda Terrorists? A Qualified
Defense of Military Commissions and United States Policy on Detainees at Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 591, 603–06 (2002). Slaughter replies to that article in
Anne-Marie Slaughter, Beware the Trumpets of War: A Response to Kenneth Anderson, 25 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 965 (2002).
55 I grant that this argument is boorishly put, but it reflects a certain exasperation at the complacency with which transatlantic elites, including both Slaughter and Justice Breyer, confidently
assert that this is part of global jurisprudence and that that is not. Such line-drawing is blind to
its own moral presuppositions while studiously ignoring the growth of a global jurisprudence that,
objectively and on its own terms, can only pose a threat to the pluralism that such elites prize.
Worse, such an approach is blind to the fact that although there are heroic efforts within Islamic
traditions to find ways to come to grips within Shari’a law with universal human rights and secular political pluralism, such efforts have largely been unsuccessful. It is a harsh and unreformed
Shari’a law that increasingly holds sway over whole populations, not just Saudi Arabia, but in
such places as Sudan and, now, large portions of Nigeria. It is incomprehensible how this movement and its antiprogressive, antiwomen agenda does not merit even minimal discussion as to its
place or lack thereof in “global jurisprudence.” But U.S. jurisprudence somehow always seems at
once an easier and more important target.
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can values, implicit or explicit in those debates, are treated as outliers.
The disturbing implication is that if U.S. judges or other actors continue to endorse certain long-held U.S. positions — in a world in
which the point of judicial opinions is to engage both the domestic political community and a global judicial audience, as well as to socialize
American judges as part of a global judicial elite — they would be encouraged to do so in terms that affirm them as global outliers, effectively delegitimizing them. As Slaughter says with respect to the First
Amendment:
[I]f the judges of the U.S. Supreme Court thought that they were playing
to a global as well as a national audience, they might readily acknowledge
that U.S. First Amendment jurisprudence is on the extreme end of the
global spectrum for protecting speech, an artifact of the particular history
of this country and the political value traditionally placed on free speech.
(p. 243)

Note how much rhetorically weaker this formulation is than simply
ruling that “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of
speech,”56 and relying on some two hundred years of Supreme Court
opinions interpreting those phrases. It is surely facile to suggest that
playing to a global audience has any rhetorical effect other than weakening the force of the U.S. constitutional command by announcing it
as a global outlier, a mere artifact of a particular culture.57
Of course, Slaughter follows by saying that the U.S. Supreme Court
might “well try to argue for the U.S. approach as compared to less
speech-protective doctrines applied in other countries, to strengthen
the impact of the decision in the global judicial human rights dialogue”
(p. 243). Leave aside the question whether Supreme Court judges
ought to conceive of themselves as involved in a “global” judicial dialogue at all over matters in which they are not agents of the world at
large but of a particular political community constituted by a particular constitution.58 Leave aside whether the U.S. Supreme Court has
any business “try[ing] to argue” with the rest of the world over U.S.
constitutional jurisprudence. Even in terms of Slaughter’s internal argument, there still remains the question whether, as a matter of the
rhetoric of judicial opinion writing, even entering into the game of defending one’s constitutional tradition to the whole world, rather than
within that admittedly particular tradition, constitutes anything other
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
56
57

U.S. CONST. amend. I.
This question is distinct from one we shall take up shortly: why should U.S. judges, bound
by fidelity to the U.S. Constitution and owing allegiance to it and to no foreign power, believe it
either part of their duty or within their discretionary gift to play to foreign audiences at all?
58 I believe Michael Walzer best articulates the theoretical, deep moral argument for fidelity by
members and fiduciary office holders to a particular political community and its constitutive constitutional norms. See MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE: A DEFENSE OF PLURALISM AND EQUALITY 31–63, 129–64 (1983).
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than a defensive weakening of the argument. One only really raises
the status of being an outlier for the purpose of questioning that status
within one’s domestic constitutional debate.59 The argument that the
United States is an outlier has appeal, I suggest, principally to those
who are skeptical in the first place of the American protection of free
speech; the argument, in other words, is a rhetorical form for undermining the status quo by casting American protection of free speech
out upon the fringes.60
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
59 The role of the transcendent, outside critic is, in fact, a noble and heroic, though often badly
rewarded, one. Consider the Bible’s Jeremiah. I wish to question whether this is the proper role
of a judge in a democratic society, since such a judge does not stand outside in order to call upon
the people to repent, but instead holds real power in his or her hands to compel, in a democratic,
constitutional order, the people to repent. Calling the people to repentance and having the power
to compel their repentance are two very different actions; the former corresponds to the role of the
outside critic, but the latter is based on a critique that is drawn from outside that tradition, yet
with power drawn from within. Thus, “compelling repentance” is not the role of a judge in a democratic polity. Yet it seems that this role is precisely what Slaughter urges.
60 Slaughter herself engages in exactly this move in another reference to the free speech debate, when she says, more candidly than in the quotation above:
Suppose that in attending a conference of constitutional judges from around the
world, U.S. judges become aware of just how far out of line they are with prevailing
doctrine in other countries. They might discover, for instance, that their fellow constitutional judges from different countries, having consulted one another’s decisions, virtually
all agree that hate speech constitutes an exception to a liberal constitutional right of
freedom of speech and should not be permitted. (p. 182) (emphasis added)
This quotation is a telling example of what Slaughter actually seems to mean by government networks; the phrase “just how far out of line” presumes that there is a way (in any sense other than
a conclusory one) in which U.S. Supreme Court opinions interpreting the First Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution are supposed to fit in relation to other constitutional courts’ interpretations.
This example is an unfortunate and rare case of A New World Order’s presuming its
conclusion.
For that matter, U.S. judges, on finding out just how “far out of line” their fidelity to U.S.
constitutional precedent is when measured against the constitutional traditions of other societies,
might then ask themselves just how long the constitutional tradition actually is in the vast majority of the countries that A New World Order encourages them to consult. Centuries? Decades?
Years? The European Union, which is at bottom the measure of most things in A New World Order, is still in the process of ratifying its constitution. Even the constitutional traditions of the
Western European states that Slaughter holds in such esteem have developed principally from
1945; the German postwar democratic achievement is magnificent, but long it is not. The same
observation applies even to France of the Fifth Republic — a country that, for all its glories, still
was, one should note, subject to the serious possibility of a military coup as late as the 1960s. The
South African court, Slaughter tells us, is a more influential source of human rights law than is
the U.S. Supreme Court (p. 207); but it is no disrespect to that genuinely great and honorable
court to say that when it has had a life of more than a decade or two — and when, as we all hope,
the state of which it is a branch has survived more than a few decades without suffering a coup or
falling prey to any of the many other disasters that can befall countries — then perhaps we can
talk of its influence. As for the Zimbabwe high court, cited by Justice Breyer in his much commented-on dissent in Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 996 (1999) (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial
of certiorari), it is no slight to that court, a last bastion of official virtue in a sea of official barbarity, to say that there is nonetheless something grotesque about Justice Breyer citing any court, no
matter how persuasive its rulings or brave its members, of a country suffering under such an abusive and tyrannical government as Robert Mugabe’s. This critique is not intended to denigrate
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Yet to stop here would be unfair to A New World Order, for the
book acknowledges and indeed strives to limit the horizontal role of
judges in their respective jurisdictions. “Our judges,” Slaughter acknowledges, “remain American judges, bound by our laws and Constitution” (p. 242). Elsewhere she says that foreign opinions in a national
court can only be of persuasive value, not precedential value (p. 101).
Likewise, she says that horizontal judicial networks preserve the possibility of informed cultural and social differences, and she believes
that a system of horizontal government networks will help ensure pluralism and respect for differences (p. 102).
I respect Slaughter’s belief that these are all principles of government networks, and I respect the effort to make them all compatible
with each other. Although I have broadly hinted at my normative
problems with Slaughter’s model, the purpose of the my criticisms is to
raise questions about the internal consistency of the argument. I find
it hard to square within the structure of the disaggregated state the
many things that A New World Order seeks to square and seems to believe it has squared.
I do not yet understand, for example, how the deeply serious conflicts between cultures, systems of law, systems of administration, and
perceptions of the meaning and importance of democratic legitimacy in
relation to unelected branches and agencies of government can be reconciled among the various states. A New World Order urges that we
generate “reasoned consensus on many problems” (p. 203). Well,
surely. The book, however, does not explain how to generate consensus when the disagreements are at the level of values. In matters such
as the death penalty, the meaning of privacy, or free expression, to
suggest that reason can solve the issue seems naïve or disingenuous.
This critique extends even to matters that, one might have thought, if
one thought of international affairs as a kind of Kelsenian science, as
being amenable to universal reason.
Slaughter offers examples of how she believes such reasoning can
occur. One is James Fearon’s methodology for making collective decisions (pp. 204–05);61 his criteria are possibly persuasive, if we are com–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
the outstanding job constitutional courts in these countries have done both within their own societies and sometimes on a wider stage; rather, it is to point out two basic facts that Slaughter resolutely ignores. The first is that however much Slaughter makes of the “disaggregated state,” the
Supreme Court of Zimbabwe is still the high court of a state, in this case a state of tyranny
against the freedoms and rights of its people. To cite such a court in any context other than the
defense of its freedom of action against the dictator is problematic at best. Second, Slaughter
makes few references to the length of American constitutional tradition except to refer to it in reference to particular issues such as the First Amendment (p. 243) that, seemingly, might have to be
tolerated as quaint custom from a culture slow to progress.
61 The author cites to James D. Fearon, Deliberation as Discussion, in DELIBERATIVE
DEMOCRACY 44 (Jon Elster ed., 1998).
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mitted in the first place to believing that the decision ought to be a collective one and that the relevant collective is the group, the global
government network of judges or others, convened to discuss the issue.
In the case of the death penalty or the range of free expression, for example, it is not self-evident that we are or ought to be committed to
having a collective discussion rather than to confining ourselves to a
discussion with the people to whom we are constitutionally committed.
To say that judges ought to be committed to both discussions as matters of the formation of constitutional law is one thing, but it is not
clear how the global discussion has a legitimate place in existing constitutional theory. When push comes to shove, one of the discussions
must take precedence as controlling and the other becomes, well, mere
discussion.
Slaughter also offers us Thomas Risse’s methodology for group
process, based on Habermas’s theory of communicative action (p.
205).62 Habermas’s theory might be criticized, however, for stressing
that politics can be reduced to something like a graduate seminar discussion in which each participant speaks for himself without any real
consequences for anyone other than himself. What Risse’s form of
communicative action theory lacks is any acknowledgment that in the
international system participants in politics speak for, and owe a primary duty to, their constituents, not to themselves or to the group.
They are primarily fiduciaries acting on behalf of others whose values
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
62 The author cites to Thomas Risse, Let’s Argue! Communicative Action in World Politics, 54
INT’L ORG. 31 (2000). The problem with Risse’s proposal is that it treats argument as a way of
trying to give the participants a sense of obligation to adhere to the outcomes of the group. This
proposal has a certain paternalistic feel similar to discussions between children and parents in
which, after much discussion, “we” reach a conclusion that will not, however, actually be conclusive until “we” reach the conclusion that our parents wanted us to reach in the first place. Such
arguments are not really arguments; they are paternalistic discussions in which the only acceptable outcome is foreordained. This foreordained paternalism is the reason that I have sometimes
urged the United States simply to stay out of debates of issues involving deep questions of sovereignty. Its interlocutors will never regard the discussion as over until a suitably antisovereignty
stance is reached, and if it is not, then the result is a denunciation of the United States for not
having argued in good faith. Better for the United States to say in advance that it is not worthwhile to argue about matters on which, because of constitutional fidelity to its people, the United
States cannot compromise.
This approach would have been the wisest one in, for example, negotiations over the ICC. I
cannot agree with Slaughter’s assessment that the ICC negotiators “got it right” by allowing the
ICC prosecutor to determine, subject only to review by a panel of the court itself, that it should
take over a given prosecution from national authorities (pp. 148–49). This procedure seems, on
the contrary, a clear instance of supranational federalism, as Dean Harold Koh candidly acknowledged in calling it a “Marbury versus Madison moment” in the development of international law.
Neil A. Lewis, U.S. Is Set To Renounce Its Role in Pact for World Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES, May 5,
2002, at 18 (reporting Koh’s comments); see also Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism, supra note
18, at 373 (noting the opposition to the ICC “on the grounds that it represents the strengthening of
international governance at the expense of American institutions”); Anderson, supra note 10, at
453–57 (discussing the ICC negotiation process).
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they represent, not seekers of reason or the truth as such, and they are
not free to ignore the constituents they represent and to depart on their
own searches for truth with their fellow truth-seekers in an international forum.63
The practical import of being a fiduciary is that matters about
which participants might be willing to compromise for the sake of
group process if they were only bargaining for themselves might well
seem non-negotiable, precisely because they do not act for themselves
alone. There is a reason, after all, why diplomats so often must seek
instructions from their governments: namely accountability.
Accountability presents an internal problem for Slaughter’s argument, oddly, because she acknowledges it — as indeed she acknowledges practically every objection to her theory, often eloquently, elegantly, and in knowledgeable detail. I admire her forthrightness in
acknowledging, for example, that representatives of a group cannot
simply set aside their representativeness and solely pay attention to
conditions of collective decisionmaking when they enter a negotiating
group (p. 218).64 But Slaughter’s acknowledgement of objections eventually becomes frustrating because it is one thing to acknowledge the
potential conflict of interest and another to explain how it is resolved
within the theory itself. I do not know how to reconcile, for example,
the following two statements: On the one hand, A New World Order
says, with respect to comparative constitutionalism, that “officials
searching for solutions may be less concerned with the source of an argument than with the merits of the argument itself” (p. 207). On the
other hand, as noted above, Slaughter acknowledges that to politicians
(and, I would add, to judges within a democratic polity) and the citizens they represent, the critical democratic accountability issue really
is the process, the source of legitimacy, rather than the quality of ideas;
the “problem, from this perspective, is not so much a lack of good
ideas, which could be remedied by looking to other countries, but the
underlying battle of interests that informs any policy choice” (p. 226).
Well, which is it?
Or consider another example. On the one hand, we are told, many
“problems will not be suitable for resolution in [government network]
forums: problems involving vital national security interests, for instance, or touching on issues of high domestic political sensitivity” (p.
208). On the other hand, among the issues that A New World Order
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
63 The discussion at pages 205–06, analogizing judges to teenagers reasoning about smoking
and reaching an informed decision, is simply inapposite to the actual conditions of fiduciaries acting for constituents. This inapposite analogy illustrates the sharp limits of simplifying analogies
about communicative action and reasoned debate.
64 For an account of the problems arising from such failures to understand the representative’s
role, see Anderson, supra note 10, at 453–57.
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thinks are ripe for solution by government networks are not only “how
best to regulate online sales of securities over the Internet” and “how
to mesh antiterrorism legislation to minimize loopholes,” but also “how
best to balance the competing constitutional demands of liberty and
order” (p. 208). Are not the demands of liberty and order as important
as vital national security and hence just as unsuitable for resolution in
government network forums and international seminars of judges?
Again, this seems to be not just a problem of external critique in the
name of democratic sovereignty, but a problem of internal inconsistency within the argument itself, of wanting to have it both ways.
The resolution, in any case, too often seems to be a kind of deus ex
machina. It consists of acknowledging the difficulty and then suggesting that with enough goodwill and wisdom, the problem can be overcome. As Slaughter says, the tone of all these discussions is “largely
optimistic” (p. 257). Leaving to one side my larger, external objection
on the basis of the value of democratic sovereignty, I find myself admiring A New World Order’s can-do attitude. The academic world
abounds, after all, with those who make their reputations by showing
why pretty much nothing at all can work and how all is for the worst
in this worst of all possible worlds. I am grateful for the presence of
academics like Slaughter who are determined to deploy vision and remarkable ingenuity to figure out how to make things work and make
things better. Yet I worry that the optimism glosses over contradictions in the argument’s internal structure — whether and to what extent government networks really can avoid being spitted on the horns
of our trilemma without requiring recourse to a sort of extratheoretical, extrastructural appeal to goodwill. Perhaps Slaughter, with her
long experience in the world of diplomats, international regulators, and
internationally minded judges, believes that such goodwill can be
treated as though it were genuinely structural and that discretion in
the use of power is part of the checks and balances of the structure.
If so, perhaps she is right. But such a formulation is not exactly
Madisonian.65
2. Vertical Networks and the Disaggregated State. — The above,
admittedly somewhat priggish, complaint is one that applies to the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
65 Whereas it is, worryingly, Monnetian in its EU-style reliance upon the consensus of elites to
make up for structural contradictions and upon the supranational conclave of national elites to go
where national populations would not themselves go. Hence, A New World Order devotes so
much attention to the proper socialization of bureaucrats and judges in order to prepare them to
play the role required to reach the proper outcomes on the range of value issues (p. 198). The
analogy to the process of European integration succeeding at the elite level while lagging at the
popular level is too well understood to rehearse again. A New World Order, as ever, acknowledges
this point and says that the world, of course, cannot be assimilated to the experience of the EU,
but then proceeds with a proposal that still resembles the experience — and, significantly, also the
hopes and aspirations — of the EU.
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book as a whole, not just to horizontal networks. Vertical government
networks under the premise of the disaggregated state not only carry
over many of the features and concerns of horizontal networks but
also, because of their coercive aspirations, raise new concerns about internal inconsistency in the argument.
The point of vertical government networks is to put the coercive
powers of national regulators or judges, who are constitutionally able
to compel their own states, behind the orders of a supranational entity.
These vertical networks “depend on the disaggregation of the state no
less than do horizontal . . . networks” (p. 21). Because of the existence
of the disaggregated state, individual institutions within a national
state are able to develop what amount to dual functions, one within
their national system and the other within their vertical network.
Slaughter asserts that this dual function, far from creating a confusion
of loyalties, in fact results in greater transparency and accountability.
National officials, she says, may have “two faces, internal and external,
but they still have only one audience,” namely, their domestic democratic constituency (p. 232). Indeed, she continues, vertical government
networks actually increase accountability, which should reassure those
critics of earlier forms of global government who worried that combinations of international organizations, NGOs, and other private actors
would lack accountability. Thus, dual function “does not imply dual
accountability” (p. 232).
I find this a difficult claim to accept, given what else A New World
Order has to say about the ways that officials are to be explicitly socialized to think of themselves as having responsibilities in a global
system and, further, to consider themselves subject at least in some
cases to individual liability for their failures to uphold international
agreements. Slaughter suggests that the solution to this problem of
dual function and, potentially, dual allegiance is that national officials
are to be
actors in national and global policymaking simultaneously[. Thus,] officials would have to be able to think at once in terms of the national and
the global interest and to sort out the relative priorities of the two on a
case-by-case basis. A national environmental regulator would have to be
able to push for a set of global environmental restrictions that do not unduly burden her national constituents, while at the same time making the
case for those restrictions to her constituents. And at times she might have
to agree to restrictions that would be considerably tighter than her constituents wanted to get an agreement that advanced the collective interests
of all nations. (p. 234)

How this is not an explicit statement of dual allegiance, dual loyalty,
and dual accountability is, frankly, unfathomable. And how the ability
lies within the authority, legitimacy, and power of a regulatory agency,
on the say-so of a particular regulator, to make the determinations of
when to press for national interest and when, without the authority of
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a higher national government, to abandon national interest in favor of
an official’s perception of collective interest is also unfathomable —
unless one makes the assumption of a disaggregated state. In that
case, then, the power of the regulator to make these kinds of calls on
her own is evident because there is, by definition, no higher unitary
state to make those judgments for her. But if this disaggregation does
exist, then it is hard to see that there is at bottom any true accountability, except when some other national actor with greater power happens
to notice that a regulator has made a judgment that it does not like.
In the case of the judiciary, no such actor may exist at all.66
Slaughter’s theory conceives of these bureaucrats as masterless
ronin. Charged in this dual system with deciding, on the basis of their
own authority, when to act for their supposed constituents and when
to act for the supposed global collective, bureaucrats are free to go
their own way.67 Yet A New World Order has, once again, anticipated
the objection and suggests that if networks are sufficiently transparent,
then they can be “monitored by ordinary voters” (p. 259). This proposition is doubtful, to judge by the experience of both the United States
and the European Union; in fact, Slaughter acknowledges as much (p.
235). But I wonder how Slaughter would regard matters if, for example, ordinary American voters, through their legislators, took due consideration of global jurisprudence, as cited and incorporated by suitably globally socialized American judges in responding to the concerns
of their global networks of judges, but nevertheless decided that certain issues, such as the death penalty, really were not an appropriate
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
66 Mechanisms to override a bureaucratic administrative action are greater in number than
those to override judges, who in this constitutional system have the last word. Slaughter wants to
take advantage of that “last word” in a completely different system.
67 There is another problem here with A New World Order’s enthusiasm for “positive comity.”
At page 259, Slaughter introduces five norms as conditions for participation in government networks, which she sees as preserving the sovereign self-respect of widely differing states. One
norm is “deliberative equality,” a presumption that all government networks should be open “to
any government officials who meet specified criteria or conditions of membership.” She does not
say what those conditions might be, although I read this in context to mean such morally neutral
criteria as the kind of subject matter under discussion, rather than normative criteria that would,
for example, exclude officials from governments engaged in serious abuses of human rights. If I
am correct in my interpretation, should officials of the government of Sudan be permitted to join
the government officials’ network discussing ways to deal with genocide? We are back at the
problem of corrupt networks, which is one reason why the United Nations can never achieve a
moral status above that of a discussion forum among the good, the bad, and the indifferent: the
U.N. is itself almost by definition a corrupt network because its doors are open to the wicked as
well as the good. It should be noted that, by calling the U.N. a corrupt network, I do not mean
that it is itself wicked — merely that it can never rise above a certain moral status. One of the
virtues of hard-nosed sovereignty, as opposed to the kind of moral relativist internationalism that
Slaughter’s criteria suggest, is that accepting sovereignty as a minimal value does not commit
oneself to comity with the wicked, but rather requires merely a certain willingness to talk and
come to prudent arrangements when necessary to avoid greater evils.
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matter for judicial dialogue with the rest of the world and consequently stripped the federal courts of certain subject matter jurisdiction. I doubt that Slaughter would greet such a development with
equanimity — as nothing more than the legitimate result of ordinary
citizens placing what they regard as the proper bounds on the “dual
allegiance” of their judges and bureaucrats through the democratic
process.
As A New World Order acknowledges, vertical networks “pierce the
shell of state sovereignty by making individual government institutions
— courts, regulatory agencies, or even legislators — responsible for the
implementation of rules created by a supranational institution” (p.
132). In a world of disaggregated states, and even more so in a world
in which individual regulators or judges are able to decide when and
to what extent to choose between national and global interests, vertical
networks represent a significant shift of power. It is not precisely a
shift of power away from national actors to supranational actors; according to A New World Order’s proposal, under the assumption of a
disaggregated state, the power whether to enforce still rests with a national actor. But in terms of the new forms of global socialization that
A New World Order endorses, and in terms of accountability to democratic constituencies, vertical networks represent a shift in power from
democratic constituencies to supranational institutions. Indeed, vertical networks explicitly endorse the ability of regulatory and judicial
agencies, and even individual agents, to make their own decisions as
between national and global interests.
Somewhat ominously for an account intended to preserve the independent sphere of national governments, Slaughter adds that national
officials, as individuals, “would also be directly subject to the obligations of treaties and other international agreements” (p. 35). Since the
state is disaggregated, it would therefore not be up to “the state” as
such to uphold human rights, protect the environment, abjure child
labor, or seek a peaceful resolution to conflicts. It would instead “be
up to the members of the executive branch, the judiciary, and the legislature,” as institutions within the disaggregated state, to do so (p. 35).
Remarkably, Slaughter adds that “in a world in which violations of international law increasingly carry individual penalties, such obligations could make themselves felt” (p. 35).68
Vertical government networks — in the form of international
courts, international agencies, or other international organizations that
can count upon the coercive power of a bureaucratic or judicial actor
through socialization, group identity, political affinity, the force of individual liability for officials, or any other factor — represent a shift in
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
68

Emphasis has been added.
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power indeed. One might think that this shift is in serious, if not fatal,
tension with the respect for national government policy that A New
World Order is also pledged to protect. And the condition that makes
such individually coercive networks possible, on this account, is the
disaggregated state: “Aid, pressure, socialization, and education would
no longer flow state to state, but would penetrate the state to the level
of specific individuals who constitute a government” (p. 35).69 The
resolution of this internal tension again turns out to be merely an extra-theoretical, non-structural one: that the coercive power of vertical
networks is a power to “be used sparingly” by someone, somehow, in
his or her presumed wisdom and discretion (p. 145). In an account
that otherwise seeks to establish a self-regulating structure, invoking
checks and balances, this concession of unrestrained discretion seems
troublingly ad hoc.
B. Disaggregated Sovereignty and a Disaggregated World Order
The claim of the disaggregated state carries with it a theoretically
important corollary — that a world of disaggregated states implies a
world of disaggregated sovereignty. What is the difference and why is
this difference important?
The notion of a disaggregated state requires understanding the
state not as a unitary institution, but instead as an agglomeration of
different centers of power, different institutions, and competing actors,
including both elected actors such as legislators and unelected actors
such as judges and bureaucrats. If the state is reconceived in this disaggregated way in its international relations, then the result will also
be a reconceived understanding of state sovereignty. It, too, becomes
disaggregated. The disaggregation of sovereignty signifies that the
constituent institutions and actors of the disaggregated state achieve a
measure of formal and legal sovereignty of their own — the formal legal capacity to undertake activities within government networks and
make them binding upon their disaggregated state. Each government
institution, Slaughter says, “would have an independent obligation to
interpret and implement international legal obligations,” in much the
way that “each branch of the U.S. government has an independent obligation to ensure that its actions conform to the Constitution” (pp.
268–69). Government networks would become formalized actors, because their individual constituent agencies and institutions would have
the sovereign status, at least within a certain subject matter, to bind
the states of which they are a part, under an umbrella of international
obligations entered into through government networks. Why describe
these substate units as sovereign over a particular subject matter? Be–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
69

Emphasis has been added.
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cause they can bind the state of which they are nominally a part, and
in that sense they meet Lincoln’s classic definition of sovereignty as “a
political community, without a political superior.”70
Slaughter claims that this extension of sovereignty to substate
agencies, for the purpose of being able to bind their own nominal state,
“will bolster the power of the state as the primary actor in the international system” (p. 269). She reasons that giving each government institution a measure of “legitimate,” that is, sovereign, authority under international law “marks government officials as distinctive in larger
policy networks and allows the state to extend its reach” (p. 269). Her
conclusion might be reasonable if states were indeed disaggregated.
But to the extent global governance exists, it is by unitary states exercising their sovereign privileges — even if that means considerably less
global governance than Slaughter would like to see. In the case of a
unitary state, giving substate agencies sovereign powers within a particular subject matter really does weaken the state. A New World Order suggests that this problem can be dealt with by the “dual”
obligations of all substate actors — specifically, by the expedient of
granting the “last word in case of disputed interpretations of international law” to either the national courts or the national legislature (p.
269). Such a remedy would preserve the vital feature of unitary state
sovereignty.
But this remedy likely weakens, not strengthens, the state. After
all, much of A New World Order is devoted to urging that courts, in
particular, socialize their members and conform their jurisprudence to
an internationalist ideal, in a manner contrary to any traditional notion
of state sovereignty. Slaughter wants courts to see themselves as willing to enforce international law obligations as judges have learned to
interpret them through their global socialization — which is to say, in
ways that favor internationalist views and disfavor merely parochial,
nationalist ones. It is slightly disingenuous to suggest that, in Slaughter’s model, courts or, for that matter, legislatures properly socialized
will be able to protect state sovereignty. Combined with Slaughter’s
vision of national officials taking personal responsibility for carrying
out the decisions of the international networks to which they belong, it
is hard to see the concept of disaggregated sovereignty as meaning
anything other than a weakening of the unitary sovereign state.
A New World Order’s final response to this problem is one of the
few places where the argument operates by pure definitional fiat.
Slaughter defines “sovereignty” not according to Lincoln’s traditional
“without a political superior” view, but instead as the “capacity to par–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
70 Abraham Lincoln, Message to Congress in Special Session (July 4, 1861), in THE
COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 421, 434 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
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ticipate in international institutions of all types — in collective efforts
to steer the international system” (p. 267). This formulation is the
“new sovereignty” championed by Chayes and Chayes, a conception of
sovereignty that accords “status and recognition to states in the international system to the extent that they are willing and able to engage
with other states, and thus necessarily accept mutual obligations” (p.
267).71 A New World Order mostly sees the new sovereignty as the
consequence of globalized problems so compelling as to drive even
powerful states such as the United States to participate in government
networks. The concept is “new” in that it gives up the sovereign’s traditional claim to do as the sovereign will, and instead claims that sovereignty resides in accepting the obligations of the international legal
system and its institutions.
Yet this new definition of sovereignty confuses sovereign power
with its benefits: there are many reasons why a sovereign would voluntarily give up certain powers in order to gain certain benefits in an
international system, but that says merely that sovereign power can be
used to secure international benefits, not that sovereignty consists of
those benefits. An empirical realist critic might challenge the new sovereignty by pointing out that the actual evidence of the disaggregated
state, the erosion of the unitary sovereign state, and the collapse of
traditional sovereignty is wildly exaggerated in the literature on global
governance, including in A New World Order, and by arguing that the
behavior of substate institutions is in fact largely explainable in traditional realist terms of sovereign interests of unitary sovereign states.72
Not being an empirical political scientist, I do not propose to offer that
kind of detailed empirical response here.
My critique, rather, is a narrower one. It is simply that telling government officials that because of the disaggregated state they are authorized to see themselves as actors at least partly independent of the
state tends, on any traditional definition of sovereignty, to weaken the
state. To then claim that the state is, on the contrary, somehow
strengthened because one has redefined sovereignty to mean engaging
in activities characteristic of giving up traditional sovereignty — regardless whether giving up sovereignty is desirable, prudent, or moral
— is just to capture the castle by definition.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
71 The author cites CHAYES & CHAYES, supra note 24, at 4. It is worth noting that the formal scope of Chayes and Chayes’s book concerns regulatory agreements, a context in which many
of their arguments make considerably more sense. It is when they — and Slaughter — go beyond
narrow regulatory and economic issues that the conceptual strain becomes evident.
72 This is the kind of realist argument I imagine would be offered by an empirical political
scientist such as Stephen D. Krasner. Cf. STEPHEN D. KRASNER, SOVEREIGNTY: ORGANIZED
HYPOCRISY (1999) (providing a defense of the realist approach to sovereignty).
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A New World Order evades the question by viewing disaggregated
sovereignty not as the consequence of something else — disaggregated
states — but rather as the cause. Instead of redefining sovereignty, A
New World Order ought simply to admit that it wants to see the old
sovereignty pass away. But so admitting would raise a large question
whether the argument really intends to avoid being impaled on the
horns of the government trilemma or whether it is, all along,
knowingly or unknowingly committed to the erosion of democratic
legitimacy.
V. REVALUING “A POLITICAL COMMUNITY,
WITHOUT A POLITICAL SUPERIOR”
The foregoing discussion has sought to critique A New World Order
from within its own premises. This Review has emphasized that the
book is mostly admirably transparent about its assumptions as well as
about its aspiration to formulate a world order that respects the three
fundamental values of global governance, democracy, and democratic
accountability. If this Review has noted places in which the vision of
A New World Order either falls short or seems internally inconsistent,
it is because the argument is so impressively transparent and because
the vision itself is nothing if not ambitious. But the internal critique
effectively amounts to a single concern, which is that the global governance by global government networks that Slaughter proposes fails
to balance the three fundamental values at issue and instead winds up
tipping in favor of global governance in ways that devalue democracy
and democratic accountability. More precisely put, the internal critique suggests that the system of global governance through global
government networks, as it grows and develops in the ways that
Slaughter outlines, over time tends to erode the respect for democracy
and democratic accountability with which it began and may finally
lead to a form of liberal internationalism, a world of de facto federalized global governance. The system of global governance that Slaughter promotes does not appear to be stable over time, and the value that
it erodes is inevitably democratic sovereignty.73
Slaughter herself is not troubled by this conclusion — far from it,
since this result is what she believes promotes a stable and just world
order. As she sees it, one effect of government networks and their socialization of a new global elite will be that over time the question of
democracy, at least insofar as it means democratic sovereignty in the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
73 Given that this is a review essay about the internal arguments of A New World Order, this
section is not intended as a full-blown defense of democratic sovereignty. But I think the essay
would be incomplete if it confined itself solely to internal arguments and failed to acknowledge
the larger, external critique.
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traditional sense of “without a political superior,” will wither in importance. Such a transformation will occur because, although national
legislatures will continue to exist and act, they will be checked by
courts and bureaucratic actors with a globalized sense of obligation; as
a result, perhaps even legislators will transcend the parochialism of
specifically representing their constituents (p. 104). In that case, democracy and democratic accountability will cease to be issues of sovereignty. Slaughter offers, then, a gradualist vision of global governance,
one in which the trilemma ceases to bite not because matters remain
balanced among the trilemma’s sharp horns, but instead because, over
time, key elites will be educated and socialized to see things differently
and will no longer value democratic sovereignty so much.74 The hope
seems to be that globalist socialization gradually alters the perceptions
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
74 This process of elite formation is one that strives to maintain a horizontal as well as a vertical dimension — horizontal in its integration with global government networks, and vertical in its
connection to democratic electorates within a country. I have suggested that in the hard cases,
when one or the other has to give, unelected bureaucrats and judges, if they have been properly
socialized in the way that the book urges, will favor the horizontal dimension. I also suggest that
this is the intention of A New World Order’s ideal position over time, because Slaughter, in the
hard cases, locates global justice in horizontal networks rather than in purely national judges.
But I would also suggest that the example of elite formation most relevant to Slaughter’s
argument — apart from European Union integration — points to horizontal integration as gradually replacing vertical integration. What A New World Order proposes is, in other words, the
formation of a global and globalist bourgeoisie, horizontally integrated with its counterparts independent of mere geography and place. This, in fact, occurred during the rise of civil society in
England and Scotland at roughly the time of Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson. What is striking
about the rise of this new bourgeoisie and its associated civil society, however, is that its class formation was “forged not only by individuals acting on the basis of economic interest but also as a
result of the withdrawal of aristocrats and gentry from village communities.” MARVIN B.
BECKER, THE EMERGENCE OF CIVIL SOCIETY IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY 3 (1994)
(emphasis added). Becker adds:
There had always been a separate and clearly defined elite culture . . . but these quality
folk had joined in the more broadly based rituals, ceremonies, and plebian pastimes. By
the late seventeenth century, however, English polite society had become freer from the
need to patronize local customs and the recreation of ordinary folk . . . .
This tendency toward a withdrawal of the “best people” from common residential,
linguistic, and cultural context shaped more than the townscape. It offered a “polite and
commercial people” the prospect of a relaxation from a demanding public life.
Id. at 4 (emphasis added). Thus, the new bourgeoisie was established by the horizontal integration of society at the expense of the vertical connection. This history finds echoes in the call for
contemporary global elite formation. For example, Wolfgang Reinicke, in support of global public
policy networks, has predicted that the “nation-state as an externally sovereign actor in the international system will become a thing of the past. . . . This requires political elites to dissociate
themselves to some degree from territory.” Wolfgang H. Reinicke, Global Public Policy, FOREIGN
AFF., Nov.–Dec. 1997, at 127, 137 (emphasis added). Global networks demand a gradual replacement of an unstable equal commitment to horizontal and vertical integration with a horizontal integration of a global and globalist bourgeoisie, freed from the constraints of territory in both
their economic activities and culture. This is not a prescription, however, for democracy and democratic accountability. Strikingly, this process has cognates even within an advanced capitalist
economy such as that of the United States. See, e.g., Kenneth Anderson, Review Essay: A New
Class of Lawyers: The Therapeutic as Rights Talk, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1062 (1996).
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of elites about the value of sovereignty, because sovereignty’s hold is
ultimately believed to be a cultural one, and not, as the realists might
understand it, one rooted in the facts of power. One might think of
this in Rousseau’s terms, as a hope that gradually the “popular will” of
particular constituencies will be replaced by the leadership of elites
who instead respond to the “general will” without diverging significantly on their understanding of the mandates of that general will because they share a similar socialization and global elite outlook.75
The above is a sweeping restatement of A New World Order’s thesis, one which Slaughter might well reject as unfairly broad in its prediction that global governance by global government networks will —
over time — proved unstable. But plainly the argument of A New
World Order depends crucially on judges and bureaucrats — unelected
and, at best, only partially democratically accountable actors — relying on their own perception of their authority in order to bind the
states of which they are nominally a part. The successive chapters of
the book are a call, in fact, to bureaucrats and judges to free themselves of what they might have thought were national limitations on
their legitimate authority, in order to enroll themselves in more socially
desirable and globally elite networks and to use their power to bind
their states. If questioned about the theory of state legitimacy on
which this exercise of bureaucratic or judicial power is based, Slaughter would likely answer that the state is disaggregated, and so is sovereignty. If the state is not a unitary creature, then centers of substate
power are freer, if not completely free, to act on their own. The legislature — typically lagging behind the unelected bureaucrats and
judges given, as Slaughter says, its democratic parochialism — might
put some restrictions on that freedom, but that freedom exists simply
because the judges are not all-powerful, not because of any respect for
democracy. In her view, one can rely on the respect for judicial independence commonly found in sovereign constitutional democracies to
insulate judges from much political pressure, even when those judges
develop a jurisprudence that leaves sovereign democratic constitutionalism far behind.
The critique this Part advances is not fundamentally an internal
one. It is instead evaluating Slaughter’s argument on the basis of the
value of democratic sovereignty, traditionally defined as a democratic
“political community, without a political superior.”76 This external critique highlights a disagreement with A New World Order that is vastly
more profound than pointing out certain internal inconsistencies. The
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
75 See JEAN JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES 26 (G.D.H.
Cole trans., E.P. Dutton & Co. 1950) (1762).
76 See Lincoln, supra note 70, at 434.
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easiest way to articulate this fundamental disagreement is to consider,
with respect to the matter of constitutional interpretation, what roles A
New World Order considers appropriate for judges and the decisions of
foreign courts, both of which put the issue of democratic constitutional
sovereignty squarely on the table.
The debate over the role of foreign court decisions is widening
among members of the U.S. Supreme Court, and Slaughter provides a
fair-minded summary of the positions. On one side is Justice Breyer,
who reviewed in his Knight v. Florida77 dissent several foreign judicial
precedents on the ground that, although such precedents were not
binding, the “[w]illingness to consider foreign judicial views in comparable cases is not surprising in a Nation that from its birth has given a
‘decent respect to the opinions of mankind.’”78 He put this claim more
modestly in his earlier dissent in Printz v. United States,79 noting that
the experience of foreign courts may “cast an empirical light on the
consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem.”80
This view is seconded by Justice Ginsburg, who has argued that many
legal problems, such as discrimination and prejudice, are global and
that “experience in one nation or region may inspire or inform other
nations or regions.”81 Justice O’Connor has similarly remarked that
although international law and the laws of other nations are “rarely
binding on our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions reached by other
countries and by the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.”82 And quite recently,
Justice Kennedy took note of European jurisprudence in his opinion in
Lawrence v. Texas.83
A New World Order makes this ideal of transjudicialism a central
theme of what global government networks should be and do. Judges
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
77
78
79
80

528 U.S. 990 (1999) (mem.).
Id. at 997 (Breyer, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
521 U.S. 898 (1997).
Id. at 977 (Breyer, J., dissenting). Beneath Justice Breyer’s soothingly disarming dissents,
which argue merely for considering such views in the same way that one might read the law reviews, lurks an actual commitment to a more robust role for foreign precedent in United States
courts. Justice Breyer advocated such a view when he debated Justice Scalia about the propriety
of referencing the decisions of foreign tribunals on January 13, 2005, at a forum cosponsored by
the U.S. Association of Constitutional Law and hosted by the Washington College of Law at
American University. See Tom Curry, Justices Debate Use of Foreign Precedents, MSNBC.COM,
Jan. 14, 2005, at http://msnbc.msn.com/id/6824149.
81 Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Affirmative Action as an International Human Rights Dialogue,
BROOKINGS REV., Winter 2000, at 2, 3.
82 Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-Sixth Annual Meeting of
the American Society of International Law (Mar. 15, 2002), in 96 AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L. PROC.
348, 350 (2002). One may argue that Justice O’Connor’s words are merely platitudinous; after all,
she was addressing the American Society of International Law.
83 123 S. Ct. 2472, 2481 (2003) (citing decisions of the European Court of Human Rights).
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should be encouraged to see themselves as engaged in a common enterprise of judging, in which they are socialized to understand themselves as creating a global jurisprudence. This transjudicialism should
be tempered, to be sure, by local and national concerns — culture, social considerations, and so on — but, in keeping with Slaughter’s ideal
of dual allegiance, the judiciary should also consciously see itself as
part of a global order. Judges should have many interactions with
each other, and specifically many face-to-face meetings, in order to develop their sense of identity and community as actors engaged in a
common enterprise of creating a global jurisprudence. They should
see themselves as engaged in “dialogue” with other courts to help find
common ground and approaches to common legal problems that, as
noted earlier, are far from limited to such cross border matters as trade
but also include the death penalty and similar “values” issues.
Indeed, there is a curious elision in both Slaughter’s and Justice
Breyer’s invocation of “common” legal problems. By invoking “common” legal problems, they implicate two distinct kinds of legal questions. One concerns legal matters that are “common” because they
cross borders, such as trade or air pollution, or because the same actual thing, circumstance, or event touches two jurisdictions. The other
concerns problems — such as the death penalty — that, in any actual
instance, exist in a single jurisdiction, but that might also occur in another jurisdiction. The latter is “common” only because it might occur
in either or both jurisdictions; it is not “common” in the sense that it
actually involves both jurisdictions. Conflating these two meanings of
“common” allows the considerations and analysis of the first, which
plainly requires some transnational rules to settle at least the jurisdictional questions, to sweep in those issues that might independently
arise in two places, such as the death penalty. While the first requires
some level of interaction, the second does not; wrapping the two together, however, conveys the impression that it does.
Slaughter makes clear that the socialization of judges is not intended merely as a means for judges to extend their knowledge and
sophistication. Rather, socialization is intended to allow judges over
time to develop genuinely global allegiances that will affect the very
process of judging. It is intended to reveal practices, such as First
Amendment jurisprudence, as “outliers” and to be a vehicle for encouraging U.S. courts to deploy their considerable powers in the interest of a globalist agenda. Slaughter intends for judges to cite foreign
cases as “persuasive authority” and argues that when judges do in fact
“cite foreign decisions as persuasive . . . constitutional crossfertilization begins to evolve into something deeper, resembling an
emerging global jurisprudence” (p. 78). And this is to take place as
“genuine transjudicial deliberation within a newly self-conscious
transnational community” (p. 78).
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Well, what is wrong with this vision? One concern is the rather
obvious point that Justice Thomas argued in Knight, that “were there
any . . . support [for the defendant’s argument] in our own jurisprudence, it would be unnecessary for proponents of the claim to rely on
the European Court of Human Rights, the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe, the Supreme Court of India, or the Privy Council.”84 Another
concern is that, as Slaughter candidly notes, it is not especially clear
that the citation of foreign case law has any real effect. For example,
she quotes Yash Ghai, who notes that in Hong Kong, “the approach to
the use of foreign cases is not very consistent; they are invoked when
they support the position preferred by the court, otherwise they are
dismissed as irrelevant” (p. 227).85 This result is not surprising, since
these cases are cited outside the context in which they actually function as law. They are bare words on paper. Cases stripped out of one
system and pressed into another might ultimately amount to mere rhetorical flourish, as Ghai observes.
This rhetorical function is likely more useful to judges outside the
United States who seek to give legitimacy to their decisions than to
judges within the United States. If your constitutional tradition is not
very longstanding or is colonially derivative, then appealing to case
law outside your own tradition can carry legitimating weight. In this
case, the stability and democratic credentials of the state to which a
court belongs also matter — an observation that seems not to have
persuaded Justice Breyer in citing to the Zimbabwe Supreme Court in
Knight. The Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has been not just an honorable court, but a heroic one. Yet there is something profoundly
wrong in citing to a court (no matter how heroic a role it has played in
the losing battle for human rights in its country) that, not of its own
choosing, is formally a branch of a cruel and tyrannical state.86 Perhaps Justice Breyer believed that by citing the Zimbabwe court, he
gave it legitimacy against Robert Mugabe’s wicked regime.87 But I
would respectfully suggest it is Mugabe’s regime to which such action
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
84
85

528 U.S. 990, 990 (Thomas, J., concurring in denail of certiorari).
Internal quotation marks have been omitted. The author quotes Yash Ghai, Sentinels of
Liberty or Sheep in Woolf’s Clothing? Judicial Politics and the Hong Kong Bill of Rights, 60
MOD. L. REV. 459, 479 (1997).
86 Indeed, even Justice Breyer later admitted to having made a “tactical error” in citing to the
Zimbabwe court, conceding that Zimbabwe is “not the human rights capital of the world.” See
Curry, supra note 80.
87 Justice Breyer subsequently confirmed this theory, explaining that he cites foreign precedents in order to help “institutions and courts trying to make their way in societies that didn’t use
to be democratic”: “For years, people all over the world have cited the [U.S.] Supreme Court, [so]
why don’t we cite them occasionally? They will then go to their legislatures and others and say,
‘See, the Supreme Court of the United States cites us.’ That might give them a leg up.” Id. (first
alteration in the original) (reporting the comments of Justice Breyer).
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lends legitimacy because, in fact, courts are not so “disaggregated”
from the state as the account in A New World Order might lead one to
think.
The value of rhetoric from outside one’s own constitutional system
is especially a different matter if one looks to two hundred years of
constitutional history. It is not American hubris, but conscientiousness, that suggests that one confine oneself to a tradition that carries
legitimacy in part because the tradition defines the sources and limits
of that legitimacy by confining them. Despite the benefits of an
Americentric approach, a sense of personal and communal attachments, social relationships, loyalty, and social obligation — all the
factors of socialization that Slaughter stresses — might still make it
seem both good and politic to cite to those outside one’s own court
system. Whether such personal and social factors affect the U.S. Supreme Court Justices’ decisions to cite to foreign tribunals, Slaughter is
plain in urging that those factors ought to play a very important role
indeed.
Citing a foreign case as persuasive authority rather than as mere
rhetorical flourish raises the deep issue of legitimacy. Justice Scalia invoked just such a concern when, attacking transjudicialism, he said
that “[w]e must never forget that it is a Constitution for the United
States of America that we are expounding.”88 Justice Scalia was not
closing himself off to the possibility that someone or some institution
outside the United States might have something relevant to say about
an American situation. He certainly recognized that, for example,
cross-border litigation by multinational entities will involve complex
issues of comity and recognition of the views of foreign courts, as
might the interpretation of treaties and other international documents
that result from a multilateral process among sovereigns. His point
was, rather, that “comparative analysis [is] inappropriate to the task of
interpreting a constitution, though it [is] of course quite relevant to the
task of writing one.”89
Constitutions are unique insofar as they are the constitutive document of a political community.90 As such, the issue is not so much the
content of doctrine but instead its provenance — the fact that it comes
out of the constitutional and constitutive processes of a particular
community. Therefore, the fact that other communities might have
different or better ways of approaching even the same issue is frankly
irrelevant. There are moments when, to be perfectly blunt, A New
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
88
89
90

Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 868 n.4 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 921 n.11 (1997) (emphasis added).
The most important discussion of this whole matter remains Rubenfeld, supra note 11. He
concludes that the “unfortunate reality, however, is that international law is a threat to democracy
and to the hopes of democratic politics all over the world.” Id. at 34.

ANDERSON - BOOKPROOFS

1308

01/16/05 – 6:07 PM

HARVARD LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 118:1255

World Order reads as a kind of letter to Justice Breyer, telling him that
he should feel empowered to do what, on some readings of his statements on this subject, he is already inclined to do — open U.S. constitutional interpretation up to transjudicial dialogue — and that, by so
doing, he will gain the approbation of progressive intellectuals and
bien-pensant opinion the world over. In an essentially moral argument, the subjective importance of believing one is on the side of progress and bien-pensant opinion is undeniably powerful.
Slaughter addresses the issue of constitutional legitimacy directly
with a thoughtful discussion centered around a closely argued and
highly informed article by Charles Fried. Fried writes in reference to
the debate between Justice Breyer and Justice Scalia:
Justice Breyer’s remarks on comparative constitutional law, if they had
appeared in a law review article, would have been quite unremarkable
. . . . As part of a judicial opinion, they were altogether remarkable. Why
should that be? The reason is that if Justice Breyer’s insertion into the
case of comparative constitutional law materials had gone unchallenged, it
would have been a step towards legitimizing their use as points of departure in constitutional argumentation . . . .91

Unlike for Fried, for Slaughter, Justice Breyer’s actions merely
raise the issue of competing interests in a political society. For citizens
and their political representatives, she says, the critical issue “may be
controlling the inputs into a particular political process — including
judicial deliberation — so as to be able to control or at least manage
the output” (p. 226). If that is so, then the problem is not content, “but
the underlying battle of interests that informs any policy choice” (p.
226).
This characterization of the issue as merely managing political inputs and outputs seems to me entirely too anodyne. Characterizing the
propriety of foreign citations as merely a partisan battle over regulations might be appropriate for purely political questions of resource allocation. But in matters of deepest constitutional interest, it has the
effect of extracting the moral content out of what is the keenest question of morality. There is something wrong with reducing the most
important social questions raised in constitutional issues to amoral
interest group battles; it subtly belittles them, implicitly urging
judges to adhere to political realities that lack the moral status to prevent the introduction of alien inputs into the sovereign constitutional system. Indeed, I would suggest that a more accurate characterization is one that recognizes the issue as one of profound moral importance.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
91 Charles Fried, Scholars and Judges: Reason and Power, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 807,
818 (2000).
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The moral heart of the debate is how one sees constitutionalism
and the U.S. Constitution in particular. In many political systems, the
constitution is a higher law, but not that much higher; it is a document
that is relatively easily amended, is highly programmatic in its structure, and possesses neither the longevity nor legitimacy that the Constitution of the United States carries. It is thus easy to comprehend
how, in such a system, legitimacy is not deeply offended by the importation of legal materials from outside the system. In fact, quite the opposite occurs, as Jed Rubenfeld observes:
For Europeans, the fundamental point of international law was to address
the catastrophic problem of nationalism — to check national sovereignty,
emphatically including national popular sovereignty. This remains the
dominant European view today. The United Nations, the emerging European Union, and international law in general are expressly understood in
Europe as . . . restraints on democracy, at least in the sense that they place
increasing power in the hands of international actors (bureaucrats, technocrats, diplomats, and judges) at a considerable remove from popular politics and popular will.92

That which Rubenfeld criticizes approximates what A New World
Order ultimately has in mind. Yet the history of the United States is
considerably different from that of Europe. Rubenfeld goes on to note
that the “U.S. Constitution did not speak in the language of universal
rights.”93 Instead, it
spoke in the language of popular sovereignty . . . . American constitutional law was understood from the outset to be part of the project of
popular self-government, as opposed to an external force checking that
project. The American language of constitutional rights, properly understood, does not claim the authority of universal law. It claims, rather, the
authority of democracy.94

The Constitution derives its legitimacy from the people who are
governed thereby and not because it is the enactment of some body of
universal law bestowed upon them by elites who obtained it from on
high and can therefore modify it as they receive further revelation.95
If that interpretation be so — and it seems to be the ordinary understanding of Americans, including their elites — then the invocation of
foreign constitutional law, no matter how persuasive its content, is
fundamentally at odds with democratic constitutional self-government.
The citizens of the United States have accepted democratic constitutional arrangements that are, in many ways, deeply countermajori–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
92
93
94
95

Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 24–25.
Id. at 29.
Id.
I address the quasi-religious overtones of these discussions in Kenneth Anderson, Reply:
Secular Eschatologies and Class Interests of the Internationalized New Class, in RELIGION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: COMPETING CLAIMS? 107 (Carrie Gustafson & Peter Juviler eds., 1999).
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tarian, but they have done so on the basis of an argument from popular sovereignty.96 The formal acceptance of constitutional legal materials from outside that system is, to say the least, inconsistent with the
traditional understanding of the compact between the governed and
the government.
Of course, judges whose constitutional philosophy is something
other than democratic self-government could gradually introduce the
persuasive authority of foreign precedent; if Justice Breyer and four
other Justices were to do so over time, revolt would not ensue. But it
would not be consistent with democratic constitutionalism as the
United States has understood it. And if the Justices and the federal
courts were to move along that road, then it would seem to me quite
appropriate for Congress to take the equally radical but entirely democratic step of stripping the federal courts of jurisdiction over
certain matters, thereby preserving the balance of democratic
governance.97
VI. CONCLUSION
The foregoing is not a full moral argument for democratic sovereignty.98 It is, rather, a defense of democratic sovereignty in the crucial
area raised by A New World Order — the judiciary. It is hard to see
how A New World Order can sustain the goal with which it began —
to reconcile some form of global governance with democracy and democratic accountability. It seems that democracy and democratic accountability, in fact, fall by the wayside in what Slaughter ultimately
sees as the virtuous result of global governance by government networks. Considering the concern for democratic control of unelected
but nonetheless necessary bureaucracies arising from the post-New
Deal welfare state,99 it is remarkable to see offered a system of global
governance predicated on the exercise of independent bureaucratic and
judicial power precisely because of an ability to exercise independent
discretionary power against the democratic state itself. I understand
fully that Slaughter sees her model as a system with checks and
balances from the elected, democratic, national organs of states and
has spent much effort seeking to construct it that way. Yet I cannot
believe that over time — if the system of global governance proceeded
as A New World Order proposes — the model could hope to sustain
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
96
97

See Rubenfeld, supra note 11, at 27.
I confine this view solely to the prospect of the federal courts introducing into constitutional
jurisprudence a body of materials that have no cognate in this country’s democratic constitutional
order. In that case, the extraordinary reassertion of democratic sovereignty by the elected
branches of government seems justified.
98 A fuller argument is found in RABKIN, supra note 7.
99 See, e.g., B. GUY PETERS, THE POLITICS OF BUREAUCRACY 299–339 (5th ed. 2001).
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much democracy in decisions that actually mattered. Slaughter’s
model strikes me as a proposal, on the contrary, for usurpation.100
Yet there is something churlish in so harsh a conclusion. After all,
A New World Order was written partly in response to critics like me
who attacked forms of global governance that transferred power to
unaccountable NGOs and private groups.101 The influential discourse
of global governance in the 1990s championed governance by publicprivate partnerships and empowering NGOs. The nineties were the
years of the NGOs, until it started to occur to wider groups of people
that they carried no special legitimacy.102 Slaughter has listened carefully to that kind of criticism and deliberately formulated a proposal
for global governance that generally removes the NGOs, corporate actors, and private actors from governance. This is a very good thing,
and it is a reason why A New World Order deserves to be read widely
and why its proposed form of global governance, through government
networks that do have some claim to accountability, will and deserves
to predominate discussion of global governance for some years to
come. Slaughter has advanced the argument and its sophistication
considerably.
Yet in the end, I cannot see that the system of A New World Order
will preserve democracy and democratic accountability. It fails to
balance the three horns of the trilemma: global governance, democracy, and democratic accountability. Slaughter’s argument produces
an unstable system and fails to square its descriptions of
what global governance will come to mean if fully undertaken as
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
100 It is the discomfort of that judgment that perhaps prompts A New World Order, midway
through the argument, to urge a “new conception of democracy, of what self-government actually
means” (p. 194). A new conception of democracy might ease the difficulty of satisfying the requirements of both global governance and democracy; on the other hand, it might simply eliminate the inconvenience of satisfying any real definition of democracy. What does this new conception of democracy turn out to be? “It is a horizontal conception of government, resting on the
empirical fact of mushrooming private governance regimes in which individuals, groups, and corporate entities in domestic and transnational society generate the rules, norms, and principles they
are prepared to live by” (p. 194). I do not know what this is supposed to mean for the democratic
state. On the one hand, it sounds vaguely libertarian; we will all set our own rules in our own
spheres of civil society. On the other hand, it sounds vaguely oppressive; private institutions, obviously such as corporations but also institutions of civil society, including churches, unchecked
by the constitutional democratic state, have often been instruments of oppression. What I do not
see in this is a conception of representative constitutional democracy in any sense continuous with
what it has ordinarily meant — majority rule through representatives elected at the ballot box
and whose majoritarianism is checked by courts within a constitutional arrangement that is given
legitimacy from the people so governed. Or in other words, a democratic political community,
without a political superior.
101 See, e.g., Anderson, The Limits of Pragmatism, supra note 18; Anderson, The Ottawa Convention, supra note 18; Anderson & Rieff, supra note 17.
102 See, e.g., NGOs: Sins of the Secular Missionaries, ECONOMIST, Jan. 29, 2000, at 25; David
Rieff, The False Dawn of Civil Society, THE NATION, Feb. 22, 1999, at 11.
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against the weaker, and ever weakening, legitimate value of
democracy. Sovereignty is important because it can shelter within
its embrace of power the weaker, yet more important, value of democracy. The value of robust democratic sovereignty is not that it must
do so, but that it can. A New World Order offers a system in which,
for all its good intentions, democracy gradually gives way because the
system finally erodes sovereignty to the point at which it serves as no
shelter for democracy at all.

